Solvency II: Stability problems with the SCR aggregation formula

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One of the central issues in the Solvency II process will be an appropriate calculation of the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). This is the economic capital which an insurance company has to hold in order to guarantee a one-year ruin probability of at most 0.5%. In the so-called standard formula, the overall SCR is calculated form individual SCR’s in a particular way that imitates the calculation of the standard deviation for a sum of normally distributed risks (SCR aggregation formula). However, in order to cope with skewness in the individual risk distributions, this formula has to be calibrated accordingly in order to maintain the prescribed level of confidence. In this paper, we want to show that the methods proposed and discussed so far still show stability problems within the general setup.

Keywords: Solvency II, SCR; Skewness, Symmetry, Calibration; Copulas

1. Introduction

In the European Solvency II project one of the major topics is the appropriate determination of the so called Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).

“The SCR corresponds to the economic capital a (re)insurance undertaking needs to hold in order to limit the probability of ruin to 0.5%, i.e. ruin would occur once every 200 years … . The SCR is calculated using Value-at-Risk techniques, either in accordance with the standard formula, or using an internal model: all potential losses, including adverse revaluation of assets and liabilities, over the next 12 months are to be assessed. The SCR reflects the true risk profile of the undertaking, taking account of all quantifiable risks, as well as the net impact of risk mitigation techniques.”

Further comments on this topic can be found in Ronkainen et al. (2007) and Sandström (2007). A suggestion for the “standard formula” (and in part also for internal models) is to aggregate the capital requirements SCR of n different lines of business (lob’s) to an overall SCR by the so called “square root formula”

\[
\text{SCR}(\alpha) = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{SCR}_i(\alpha)^2 + 2 \sum_{i<j} \rho_{ij} \text{SCR}_i(\alpha) \text{SCR}_j(\alpha)}
\]

(1)

where the \(\rho_{ij}\) denote the linear correlation coefficients between the risks of the different lob’s

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2 The notation used here and in the sequel makes it more clear that the solvency capital requirements also depend on the ruin probability \(\alpha\) which is presently set to \(\alpha = 0.005\) by the European Commission.
This formula is correct in the sense that the prescribed overall confidence level of 99.5% (or, more generally, $1 - \alpha$ for a given ruin probability $0 < \alpha < 1$) is maintained within the world of normal risk distributions, for the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as well as for the Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR) as underlying risk measures (see e.g. Koryciorz (2004), Chapter 2). In particular, we have:

$$\text{VaR}_i(\alpha) = \mu_i + \kappa(\alpha) \cdot \sigma_i, \quad \text{TVaR}_i(\alpha) = \mu_i + \frac{e^{(\kappa(\alpha))^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi \alpha}} \sigma_i = \mu_i + \tau(\alpha) \cdot \sigma_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $\kappa(\alpha) = \Phi^{-1}(1-\alpha)$ denotes the $1-\alpha$-quantile of the standard normal distribution with cumulative distribution function (cdf)

$$\Phi(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} \exp\left(-\frac{u^2}{2}\right) du, \quad x \in \mathbb{R}. \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

Here, $\mu_i \in \mathbb{R}$ denotes the expectation of the risk of lob $i$ and $\sigma_i \geq 0$ its corresponding standard deviation. From the above formulas it follows, according to Sandström (2006, p. 214), that in the world of normal distributions the capital requirements $\text{SCR}_i$ are given by appropriate multiples of the standard deviations, as differences of the risk measure and the individual expectation:

$$\text{SCR}_i(\alpha) = \delta(\alpha) \cdot \sigma_i \quad \text{with} \quad \delta(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \kappa(\alpha) & \text{for VaR}(\alpha) \\
\tau(\alpha) & \text{for TVaR}(\alpha). \end{cases} \hspace{1cm} (4)$$

Note that the two types of SCR discussed in Sandström (2006), based on the standard deviation principle as well as on the VaR / TVaR, coincide in the normal world. There is, however, a major problem arising if the risks of the individual lob’s are not normally distributed. This affects the square root formula in two ways: firstly, in a general misspecification of the overall SCR even if the risks are independent (and hence all $\rho_{ij}$ are zero); secondly, in a misspecification of the overall SCR if the risks are uncorrelated but dependent. The first point has already been addressed in several publications before (see e.g. Sandström (2007) and the references given therein, or Sandström (2006), Chapter 9), considering certain calibration techniques that are based on the Cornish-Fisher expansion for the risk measures above and the skewness of the underlying risks. The second point has seemingly not found that kind of attention so far, to our knowledge.

In this paper, we firstly want to demonstrate that even if the individual SCR’s (of the second type, based on VaR as the underlying risk measure) are exactly known and the resulting aggregate risk distribution is symmetric (and hence no calibrations are necessary), the square root formula can severely underestimate the true SCR. Secondly, we show that under a certain kind of dependence structure (so called grid type copulas) it is easy to construct cases of uncorrelated risks, for which the square root formula fails in a similar manner.

2. Aggregated SCR’s for independent Beta distributed risks

In this section we investigate the behaviour of the square root formula for certain independent Beta distributed risks. This class of risk distributions is e.g. used in certain geophysical
modelling software tools in connexion with “secondary uncertainties” (for a survey over this topic, see Grossi and Kunreuther (2005) or Straßburger (2006)). Beta distributions are an appropriate modelling tool if the possible damages from the risk under consideration are bounded above, e.g. by the sum insured in a windstorm portfolio. A further advantage of this family is the possibility to calculate explicitly the convolution density and cdf for integer values of the parameters which makes a mathematical analysis easier.

In what follows we consider Beta distributed risks $X$ with densities

$$f_X(x; n, m) = (n+m+1) \binom{n+m}{n} x^n (1-x)^m, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1; \quad n, m \in \mathbb{Z}^+ = \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}. \quad (5)$$

$F_X(x; n, m)$ will denote the corresponding cdf. Since the densities in (5) are polynomials the convolution density for the aggregated risk $S = X + Y$ for independent summands with parameters $n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2$ is piecewise polynomial and can easily be calculated via the following formula:

$$f_S(x; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) = \begin{cases} \int_{0}^{x} f_X(y; n_1, m_1) \cdot f_Y(x-y; n_2, m_2) \, dy, & 0 \leq x \leq 1 \\ \int_{x-1}^{x} f_X(y; n_1, m_1) \cdot f_Y(x-y; n_2, m_2) \, dy, & 1 \leq x \leq 2. \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

Likewise, the cdf $F_S$ for the aggregated risk $S$ is also piecewise polynomial and can be calculated via

$$F_S(x; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) = \begin{cases} \int_{0}^{x} f_S(u; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) \, du, & 0 \leq x \leq 1 \\ F_S(1) + \int_{1}^{x} f_S(u; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) \, du, & 1 \leq x \leq 2. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

The Appendix contains some explicit expressions for the cdf’s from a selection of parameters that will be considered in more detail in the course of the paper.

With the help of these results, it is possible to calculate (in the final step numerically) the true SCR’s, for the individual risks as well as for the aggregated risk. Note that for a risk $X$ with density given in (5), we have $E(X) = \frac{n+1}{n+m+2}$ and hence

$$\text{SCR}_X(\alpha) = \text{VaR}_X(\alpha) - E(X) = F_X^{-1}(1-\alpha; n, m) - \frac{n+1}{n+m+2}. \quad (8)$$

The following table shows some selected results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(n, m)$</th>
<th>(0,0)</th>
<th>(1,0)</th>
<th>(2,0)</th>
<th>(3,0)</th>
<th>(0,1)</th>
<th>(0,2)</th>
<th>(0,3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCR$_X$ (0.01)</td>
<td>0.4900</td>
<td>0.3283</td>
<td>0.2466</td>
<td>0.1974</td>
<td>0.5666</td>
<td>0.5345</td>
<td>0.4837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR$_X$ (0.005)</td>
<td>0.4950</td>
<td>0.3308</td>
<td>0.2483</td>
<td>0.1987</td>
<td>0.5959</td>
<td>0.5790</td>
<td>0.5340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab. 1: solvency capital requirements for *individual* risk distributions

The following table contains the true SCR values for the aggregated risk $S = X + Y$, with independent Beta distributed risks $X$ and $Y$, in comparison to the values $\text{SCR}^\sqrt{\cdot}$ obtained via the square root formula (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(n, m)$</th>
<th>$f_S$</th>
<th>SCR $\cdot (0.01)$</th>
<th>SCR $\sqrt{\cdot} (0.01)$</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
<th>SCR $\cdot (0.005)$</th>
<th>SCR $\sqrt{\cdot} (0.005)$</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>line 1: (0,0,0,0)</td>
<td>0.8585</td>
<td>0.6929</td>
<td>-19.28</td>
<td>0.7000</td>
<td>-22.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 2: (1,0,1,0)</td>
<td>0.5942</td>
<td>0.4643</td>
<td>-21.85</td>
<td>0.4678</td>
<td>-24.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 3: (2,0,2,0)</td>
<td>0.4512</td>
<td>0.3488</td>
<td>-22.70</td>
<td>0.3511</td>
<td>-24.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 4: (3,0,3,0)</td>
<td>0.3633</td>
<td>0.2792</td>
<td>-23.12</td>
<td>0.2810</td>
<td>-24.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 5: (0,1,0,1)</td>
<td>0.8384</td>
<td>0.8013</td>
<td>-4.41</td>
<td>0.8428</td>
<td>-8.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 6: (0,2,0,2)</td>
<td>0.7352</td>
<td>0.7559</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>0.8187</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 7: (0,3,0,3)</td>
<td>0.6436</td>
<td>0.6841</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>0.7553</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 8: (0,1,1,0)</td>
<td>0.7479</td>
<td>0.6549</td>
<td>-12.44</td>
<td>0.6816</td>
<td>-14.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 9: (2,0,2,0)</td>
<td>0.6478</td>
<td>0.5887</td>
<td>-9.13</td>
<td>0.6300</td>
<td>-10.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 10: (0,3,3,0)</td>
<td>0.5656</td>
<td>0.5225</td>
<td>-7.61</td>
<td>0.5698</td>
<td>-8.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 11: (1,2,2,1)</td>
<td>0.6331</td>
<td>0.5822</td>
<td>-8.04</td>
<td>0.6136</td>
<td>-10.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 12: (1,3,3,1)</td>
<td>0.5758</td>
<td>0.5367</td>
<td>-6.79</td>
<td>0.5729</td>
<td>-8.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 13: (1,4,4,1)</td>
<td>0.5252</td>
<td>0.4933</td>
<td>-6.06</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>-7.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 14: (4,8,8,4)</td>
<td>0.4023</td>
<td>0.3910</td>
<td>-2.79</td>
<td>0.4251</td>
<td>-3.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 2: solvency capital requirements for *aggregate* risk distributions
As is clearly seen, the square root formula in most cases underestimates the true SCR significantly, in particular in cases where the distribution of the aggregate risk is skewed to the left (lines 2 to 4); but this holds also true in some cases where the distribution of the aggregate risk is symmetric. Lines 5 and 6 show cases where the distributions of the aggregate risk both are skewed to right, yet the square root formula produces deviations in both directions! Interestingly, a major deviation occurs also if the individual risks and hence also the aggregated risk are symmetrically distributed (line 1). However, there are also symmetric cases where the square root formula overestimates the true SCR, as can be seen from the last line in table 2.

A closer analysis shows that for a special case of symmetry, namely for parameters of the form \((n, m_1, m_2, m_3) = (0, n, n, 0)\), we have

\[
F_s(x; 0, n, n, 0) \sim \frac{n+1}{n+2} x^{\alpha+2}
\]

for small values of \(x\) which, by symmetry, leads to

\[
SCR_s(\alpha; n) \sim SCR_{\text{app}}(\alpha; n) = 1 - \left(\frac{n+2}{n+1}\right)^{1/(\alpha+2)}
\]

for small values of \(\alpha\). The following table shows the corresponding values, for \(\alpha = 0.005\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(SCR_s(\alpha; n))</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.8008</td>
<td>0.7056</td>
<td>0.6239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SCR_{\text{app}}(\alpha; n))</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.8042</td>
<td>0.7142</td>
<td>0.6376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 3

On the other hand, an asymptotic expansion of \(SCR^f(\alpha; n)\) for this case shows that

\[
SCR^f(\alpha; n) = \sqrt{\left(1 - \alpha\right)^{1/(\alpha+1)} - \left(\frac{n+1}{n+2}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{n+1}{n+2} - \alpha^{1/(\alpha+1)}\right)^2}
\]

\[
- SCR_{\text{app}}^f(\alpha; n) = \frac{\sqrt{(n+1)^2 + 1}}{n+2} - \frac{n+1}{\sqrt{(n+1)^2 + 1}} \alpha^{1/(\alpha+1)}
\]

for small values of \(\alpha\). The following table shows the corresponding values, for \(\alpha = 0.005\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(n)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(SCR^f(\alpha; n))</td>
<td>0.7000</td>
<td>0.6816</td>
<td>0.6300</td>
<td>0.5698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SCR_{\text{app}}^f(\alpha; n))</td>
<td>0.7035</td>
<td>0.6821</td>
<td>0.6283</td>
<td>0.5666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 4
Some further analysis shows that for large values of $n$, we obtain

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\text{SCR}^\mathcal{F}(\alpha;n)}{\text{SCR}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{app}}}(\alpha;n)} = L(\alpha) = -\sqrt{\left(1 + \ln \alpha \right)^2 + \left(1 + \ln(1 - \alpha) \right)^2} \quad \text{ln} \, \alpha.
$$

This indicates that for the considered kind of symmetry, $(n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) = (0, n, n, 0)$, the square root formula produces SCR values that are systematically too low compared with the true SCR values for the aggregate risk.

3. Aggregated SCR’s for uncorrelated risks

In this section we investigate the behaviour of the square root formula for uncorrelated, but stochastically dependent risks. As a modelling tool, we use grid type copulas which have been introduced in Straßburger and Pfeifer (2005), see also Straßburger (2006). Recall for short that a copula $C$ is a multivariate distribution function of a random vector that has continuous uniform margins. Its general importance is described in Sklar’s Theorem. Let $H$ denote a $d$-dimensional distribution function with margins $F_1, \ldots, F_d$. Then there exists a $d$-copula $C$ such that for all $(x_1, \ldots, x_d) \in \mathbb{R}^d$,

$$
H(x_1, \ldots, x_d) = C\left(F_1(x_1), \ldots, F_d(x_d)\right).
$$

(13)

If all the margins are continuous, then the copula is unique, and is determined uniquely on the ranges of the marginal distribution functions otherwise. Moreover, the converse of the above statement is also true. If we denote by $F_1^{-1}, \ldots, F_d^{-1}$ the generalized inverses of the marginal distribution functions, then for every $(u_1, \ldots, u_d)$ in the unit $d$-cube,

$$
C(u_1, \ldots, u_d) = H\left(F_1^{-1}(u_1), \ldots, F_d^{-1}(u_d)\right).
$$

(14)

Copulas can be estimated below and above by the so called Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds:

$$
\mathcal{W}(u_1, \ldots, u_d) = \max(u_1 + \cdots + u_d - d + 1, 0) \leq C(u_1, \ldots, u_d) \leq \min(u_1, \ldots, u_d) = \mathcal{M}(u_1, \ldots, u_d)
$$

(15)
Note, however, that the lower Fréchet-Hoeffding bound is a copula only for \( d = 2 \), while the upper bound is a copula for all \( d \in \mathbb{N} \). In two dimensions, the pair \((U, 1-U)\) has the lower Fréchet-Hoeffding bound as copula, while the \( d \)-dimensional random vector \( U = (U, \ldots, U) \) has the upper Fréchet-Hoeffding bound as copula; here \( U \) denotes a uniformly distributed random variable over the unit interval. For further detail on copulas, especially in connexion with risk management, see McNeil et al. (2005).

A grid type copula is defined as follows:

**Definition.** Let \( d, n \in \mathbb{N} \) and define intervals \( I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d} := \prod_{j=1}^d [\frac{i_j - 1}{n}, \frac{i_j}{n}] \) for all possible choices \( i_1, \ldots, i_d \in N_n := \{1, \ldots, n\} \). If \( a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) \) are non-negative real numbers with the property

\[
\sum_{(i_1,\ldots,i_d) \in J(n)} a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) = \frac{1}{n}
\]  

(16)

for all \( k \in \{1, \ldots, d\} \) and \( i_k \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \), with \( J(i_k) := \{(j_1, \ldots, j_d) \in N_n^d \mid j_k = i_k\} \), then the function \( c_n := n^d \sum_{(i_1,\ldots,i_d) \in N_n^d} a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) \mathbb{1}_{I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}}(n) \) is the density of a \( d \)-dimensional copula, called grid-type copula with parameters \( \{a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n)\mid (i_1, \ldots, i_d) \in N_n^d\} \). Here \( \mathbb{1}_A \) denotes the indicator random variable of the event \( A \), as usual.

It is easy to see that in case of an absolutely continuous \( d \)-dimensional copula \( C \), with continuous density

\[
c(u_1,\ldots,u_d) = \frac{\partial^d}{\partial u_1 \cdots \partial u_d} C(u_1,\ldots,u_d), \quad (u_1,\ldots,u_d) \in (0,1)^d,
\]  

(17)

can be approximated arbitrarily close by a density of a grid-type copula. The classical *multivariate mean-value-theorem* of calculus tells us here that we only have to choose

\[
a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) := \int_{\frac{i_2-1}{n}}^{\frac{i_2}{n}} \cdots \int_{\frac{i_d-1}{n}}^{\frac{i_d}{n}} c(u_1,\ldots,u_d) \, du_1 \cdots du_d, \quad i_1,\ldots,i_d \in N_n,
\]  

(18)

Another interpretation of grid type copulas is given by the observation that a random vector \( U = (U_1,\ldots,U_d) \) possesses a grid type copula type iff

\[
P^U\left( \bullet \mid U \in I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) \right) = \mathcal{R}\left(I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n)\right)
\]  

(19)

with \( P(U \in I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n)) = a_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) \), i.e. the conditional distribution of \( U \) given the hypercube \( I_{i_1,\ldots,i_d}(n) \) is \( d \)-dimensional continuous uniform (denoted by \( \mathcal{R}(\cdot) \)).
A major advantage of grid type copulas is that they allow the explicit calculation of sums of dependent uniformly distributed random variables. This is essentially due to the following result.

**Lemma.** Let \( U_1, \ldots, U_d \) be independent standard uniformly distributed random variables and let \( f_d \) and \( F_d \) denote the density and cumulative distribution function of \( S_d := \sum_{i=1}^{d} U_i \), resp., for \( d \in \mathbb{N} \). Then

\[
f_d(x) = \frac{1}{2(d-1)!} \sum_{k=0}^{d} (-1)^k \binom{d}{k} (x-k)^{d-k-1} \text{sgn}(x-k) \mathbb{I}_{[0,d]}(x) \tag{20}
\]

\[
F_d(x) = \frac{1}{2d!} \sum_{k=0}^{d} (-1)^k \binom{d}{k} \left((-k)^d + (x-k)^d \text{sgn}(x-k)\right) \mathbb{I}_{[0,d]}(x) + \mathbb{I}_{(d,\infty]}(x)
\]

for \( x \in \mathbb{R} \). This follows e.g. from Uspensky (1937), Example 3, p.277, who attributes this result already to Laplace.

**Theorem.** Let \( U = (U_1, \ldots, U_d) \) be a random vector whose joint cumulative distribution function is given by a grid-type copula with density \( c_n := \sum_{(i_1, \ldots, i_d) \in \mathbb{N}_n^d} a_{i_1, \ldots, i_d} (n) \mathbb{I}_{(i_1, \ldots, i_d)}(n) \). Then the density and cdf \( \tilde{f}_d(n; \cdot) \) and \( \tilde{F}_d(n; \cdot) \), resp., for the sum \( S_d := \sum_{j=1}^{d} U_j \) is given by

\[
\tilde{f}_d(n;x) = n \sum_{(i_1, \ldots, i_d) \in \mathbb{N}_n^d} a_{i_1, \ldots, i_d} (n) \cdot f_d \left( nx + d - \sum_{j=1}^{d} i_j \right)
\]

\[
\tilde{F}_d(n;x) = \sum_{(i_1, \ldots, i_d) \in \mathbb{N}_n^d} a_{i_1, \ldots, i_d} (n) \cdot F_d \left( nx + d - \sum_{j=1}^{d} i_j \right)
\]

for \( x \in \mathbb{R} \), (21)

with \( f_d \) and \( F_d \) as defined in (20).

**Example.** Consider the weights \( a_j(n), \ n = 3 \) for a copula density given in matrix form

\[
A(3) = [a_j(3)] = \begin{bmatrix}
a & b & 1/3 - a - b \\
c & 1 - 4a - 2b - 2c & -2/3 + 4a + 2b + c \\
1/3 - a - c & -2/3 + 4a + b + 2c & 2/3 - 3a - b - c
\end{bmatrix}
\]

(22)

with suitable real numbers \( a, b, c \in [0,1/3] \). It follows that the covariance of the corresponding random variables \( (U_1, U_2) = (X, Y) \) is given by

\[
E(XY) - E(X)E(Y) = \frac{1}{9} \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{3} a_j(3)(i-2)(j-2) = 0,
\]
i.e. the random variables (risks) \( X, Y \) are \textit{uncorrelated} but in general \textit{dependent} (unless \( a = b = c = \frac{1}{9} \)). If we denote \( \gamma = (a, b, c) \) for short, the above theorem implies the following explicit representation of the cdf \( \tilde{F}_2(3; \gamma; x) \) of the aggregated risk \( S = X + Y \) (see Straßburger and Pfeifer (2005), section 3):

\[
\tilde{F}_2(3; \gamma; x) = \begin{cases} 
0, & x \leq 0 \\
\frac{9a}{2}x^2, & 0 \leq x \leq \frac{1}{3} \\
\frac{9}{2}(-a + \{b + c\})x^2 + 3(2a - \{b + c\})x + \frac{1}{2}(-2a + \{b + c\}), & \frac{1}{3} \leq x \leq \frac{2}{3} \\
\frac{3}{2}(5 - 18a - 12\{b + c\})x^2 + (-10 + 36a + 27\{b + c\})x + \frac{1}{6}(20 - 66a - 57\{b + c\}), & \frac{2}{3} \leq x \leq 1 \\
\frac{9}{2}(-3 + 14a + 6\{b + c\})x^2 + (32 - 144a - 63\{b + c\})x + \frac{1}{6}(-106 + 474a + 213\{b + c\}), & 1 \leq x \leq \frac{4}{3} \\
\frac{9}{2}(2 - 11a - 4\{b + c\})x^2 + (-28 + 156a + 57\{b + c\})x + \frac{1}{6}(134 - 726a - 267\{b + c\}), & \frac{4}{3} \leq x \leq \frac{5}{3} \\
\frac{3}{2}(-2 + 9a + 3\{b + c\})x^2 + 3(4 - 18a - 6\{b + c\})x + (-11 + 54a + 18\{b + c\}), & \frac{5}{3} \leq x \leq 2 \\
1, & x \geq 2.
\end{cases}
\]

The following graph shows visualizations of these cdf’s, for various parameter choices.

---

\[\text{Fig. 2}\]
From (23), we also obtain explicitly the corresponding quantile functions \( Q_2(3; \gamma; \cdot) \) because only quadratic equations have to be solved for this purpose. The following formula shows the results for three selected parameter vectors \( \gamma \) in the range relevant for Solvency purposes:

\[
Q_2(3; \gamma; 1-\alpha) = \begin{cases} 
2 - \sqrt{\alpha}, & 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{1}{9}, \\
\frac{4}{3} + \frac{1}{3}\sqrt{2-9\alpha}, & \frac{1}{9} \leq \alpha \leq \frac{2}{9}, \\
0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{2}{9}, & \gamma = \left(0, \frac{2}{9}, \frac{2}{9}\right): \text{ case [1]} \\
2 - \sqrt{2\alpha}, & \gamma = \left(\frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}\right): \text{ case [2]} \\
\frac{5}{3} - \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2\alpha}, & 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{2}{9}, \quad \gamma = \left(\frac{2}{9}, 0, 0\right): \text{ case [3]}
\end{cases}
\]

Note that case [1] ("upper positive dependence") and case [3] ("upper negative dependence") correspond in a sense to the extreme cases under the above setup; see Fig. 2. Case [2] corresponds to the independent case (cf. the first line in table 2). Using (24), we can explicitly calculate the correct SCR values for the aggregate risk; in the subsequent table these are compared with the former results of the square root formula (note that due to the zero covariance of \( X \) and \( Y \), no correction term is necessary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>SCR( _A(\alpha) ) (case [1])</th>
<th>SCR( _A(\alpha) ) (case [2])</th>
<th>SCR( _A(\alpha) ) (case [3])</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.8585</td>
<td>0.5960</td>
<td>0.6929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error in %</td>
<td>-23.01</td>
<td>-19.28</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.9293</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.6167</td>
<td>0.7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error in %</td>
<td>-24.67</td>
<td>-22.21</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 5

It is perhaps surprising to see again a huge amount of instability in the square root formula here, from severe underestimation of the true SCR (as we have seen for left-skewed aggregated – independent – risks before), up to a significant overestimation of the true SCR. Note that the original risks as well as the aggregate risk have a symmetric distribution in all three cases.

4. Further problems with the aggregation formula

In this last section, we return to the setup of section 2, but this time we allow for dependencies for the risks \( X \) and \( Y \) based on the upper and lower Fréchet-Hoeffding copulas as extreme cases of stochastic dependence. For simplicity, we concentrate on the symmetry case \((n, m_1, n_2, m_2) = (0, n, n, 0)\) again. According to the comment after relation (15) above and
Sklar’s Theorem, we can represent the risks $X$ and $Y$ as functions of just one uniformly distributed random variable $U$ via

$$X = F_X^{-1}(U; 0, n) = 1 - (1 - U)^{1/(n+1)}$$

$$Y = F_X^{-1}(U; n, 0) = U^{1/(n+1)}$$

(25)

for the upper Fréchet-Hoeffding copula, case $[u]$ (this follows readily from (5), see also Appendix, table 10) and

$$X = F_X^{-1}(U; 0, n) = 1 - (1 - U)^{1/(n+1)}$$

$$Y = F_X^{-1}(1 - U; n, 0) = (1 - U)^{1/(n+1)}$$

(26)

for the lower Fréchet-Hoeffding copula, case $[l]$. Thus the aggregated risk $S$ has the representation

$$S = \begin{cases} 1 + U^{1/(n+1)} - (1 - U)^{1/(n+1)} & \text{for case } [u] \\ 1 & \text{for case } [l], \end{cases}$$

(27)

which, by monotonicity arguments, implies that the corresponding quantile function $Q^*_S$ is similarly given by

$$Q^*_S(u; 0, n, n, 0) = 1 + u^{1/(n+1)} - (1 - u)^{1/(n+1)} \quad \text{for } 0 \leq u \leq 1, \text{ for case } [u].$$

(28)

As a simple consequence, the exact SCR for the aggregate risk for case $[u]$ can be written down as follows:

$$\text{SCR}^*_S(\alpha; n) = (1 - \alpha)^{1/(n+1)} - \alpha^{1/(n+1)}$$

(29)

while the adjusted SCR from the square root formula (1) is given by

$$\text{SCR}^{\sqrt{\cdot}}(\alpha; n) = \sqrt{\left(1 - \alpha\right)^{(n+1)}} - \frac{n+1}{n+2} + \cdots$$

$$\left(1 - \alpha\right)^{(n+1)} - \frac{n+1}{n+2} \right)^2 + \cdots$$

(30)

for $0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{1}{2}$ where $\rho_n$ denotes the correlation between $U^{1/(n+1)}$ and $1 - (1 - U)^{1/(n+1)}$. This can again be exactly calculated, via the following intermediate formula, with $m = n + 1$,

$$\int_0^1 u^{1/m} \left(1 - (1 - u)^{1/m}\right) du = \frac{m}{m+1} - \int_0^1 (u(1-u))^{1/m} du = \frac{m}{m+1} - \frac{4^{1/m} \sqrt{\pi} \Gamma\left(\frac{1}{m} + \frac{1}{m}\right)}{2 \Gamma\left(\frac{3}{2} + \frac{1}{m}\right)}$$

(31)

giving
\[
\rho_n = (n+1)(n+3) - \frac{(n+2)^2(n+3)}{n+1} \cdot \frac{4^{1/(n+1)}}{2^n \Gamma\left(\frac{3}{2} + \frac{1}{n+1}\right)}. \tag{32}
\]

Note that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \rho_n = \frac{\pi^2}{6} - 1 = 0.6449... \) The following table shows some numerical results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>( \text{SCR}_s^\prime(n; \alpha) )</th>
<th>( \text{SCR}^\prime(n; \alpha) )</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.9800</td>
<td>0.8949</td>
<td>0.7812</td>
<td>0.6812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.9900</td>
<td>0.9267</td>
<td>0.8273</td>
<td>0.7328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 6

The asymptotic error for \( n \to \infty \) is \(-6.19\% \) for \( \alpha = 0.01 \) and \(-5.57\% \) for \( \alpha = 0.005 \). This again indicates that the square root formula systematically underestimates the required SCR for this symmetry case, even with the proper correction term for correlation. The following graph shows the asymptotic ratio \( L^*(\alpha) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\text{SCR}^\prime(n; \alpha)}{\text{SCR}_s^\prime(n; \alpha)} \) for \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq 0.25 \).

The explicit form of this limit function is given by

\[
L^*(\alpha) = \frac{\sqrt{9(A(\alpha) + B(\alpha))^2 + (36 - 3\pi^2)(A(\alpha) + B(\alpha))) - 3\pi^2 A(\alpha)B(\alpha) + (36 - 3\pi^2)}}{3(A(\alpha) - B(\alpha))} \tag{33}
\]

for \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{1}{2} \), with \( A(\alpha) = \ln(1 - \alpha) \), \( B(\alpha) = \ln \alpha \). Note that \( \lim_{\alpha \to 0} L^*(\alpha) = 1 \).
For case [\(I\)], it is easy to see that due to \(S\) being a constant, the true SCR is zero, while now

\[
\text{SCR}(\alpha; n) = \left( \frac{1}{n+2} \left(1 - \alpha \right)^{1/(n+1)} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{n+1}{n+2} - \alpha \right)^2 + \cdots
\]

(34)

for \(0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{1}{2}\) which is strictly positive for all \(n\), with limit zero for \(n \to \infty\). (Note that the correlation \(\rho_n\) from (32) changes its sign here).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(\alpha)</th>
<th>(n = 0)</th>
<th>(n = 1)</th>
<th>(n = 2)</th>
<th>(n = 3)</th>
<th>(n = 10)</th>
<th>(n = 20)</th>
<th>(n = 50)</th>
<th>(n = 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2869</td>
<td>0.3434</td>
<td>0.3399</td>
<td>0.2074</td>
<td>0.1249</td>
<td>0.0563</td>
<td>0.0293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3119</td>
<td>0.3842</td>
<td>0.3870</td>
<td>0.2460</td>
<td>0.1501</td>
<td>0.0682</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 7

The correlation adjusted square root formula hence significantly overestimates the true SCR, except for the trivial case \(n = 0\).

5. Discussion

The foregoing analysis clearly shows that necessary calibrations of the standard SCR aggregation formula based on skewness and / or correlation alone cannot be sufficient for general purposes. For the class of risk distributions considered above the square root formula tends to underestimate the true aggregate SCR considerably, for both kinds of skewness, although in some cases also the converse is true. Table 2 shows examples where the square root formula overestimates the true SCR even in cases of skewness to the right! This seems to be a general drawback of the standard deviation oriented SCR aggregation formula outside the world of normal or, more generally, elliptically contoured risk distributions. In our opinion, the general implementation of such a rule in a European standard formula should be done only after a very thorough market wide investigation of the type and shape of risk distributions that occur in practice. Otherwise there is a danger that companies which use more sophisticated internal models are “punished” by higher solvency capital requirements in comparison with those companies that only use a standard approach.

From a mathematical point of view, the only reasonable “all-purpose” calibration seems to be the application of the maximum possible value 1 for the correlations in the square root formula, which is equivalent to the additivity rule for aggregate SCR’s, i.e.

\[
\text{SCR} = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{SCR}_{i}^2} + 2 \sum_{i<j} \text{SCR}_{i} \text{SCR}_{j} = \sqrt{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{SCR}_{i} \right)^2} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{SCR}_{i}.
\]

(35)

This would at least be generally consistent with the use of coherent (in particular, sub-additive) risk measures \(R\) for the calculation of the individual SCR’s as
\[ SCR_j = R(X_j) - E(X_j) \]  

(36)

where \( X_j \) denotes the risk pertaining to lob \( i \), because of the inequality

\[
SCR_{\text{total}} = R \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \right) - E \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \right) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{n} R(X_i) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} E(X_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SCR_j.
\]

(37)

Formula (35) would hence produce a value that is generally sufficiently large to maintain the prescribed 99.5% confidence level. Although VaR is not in all cases coherent (see e.g. the discussion in McNeil et al. (2005), Chapter 6, or Straßburger (2006), Chapter 7) there are certainly more situations in which formula (35) provides a sufficiently large SCR on the VaR basis compared with formula (1). This holds at least true for all of the examples considered in this paper. For instance, the modified table 2 reads (with \( SCR^+ (\alpha) \) denoting the SCR according to rule (35)):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>((n, m, n, m))</th>
<th>Density ( f_s )</th>
<th>(SCR_S(0.01))</th>
<th>(SCR^+ (0.01))</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
<th>(SCR_S(0.005))</th>
<th>(SCR^+ (0.005))</th>
<th>Error in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>line 1: (0,0,0,0)</td>
<td>0.8585</td>
<td>0.9800</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.9900</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 2: (1,0,1,0)</td>
<td>0.5942</td>
<td>0.6566</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>0.6158</td>
<td>0.6616</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 3: (2,0,2,0)</td>
<td>0.4512</td>
<td>0.4932</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>0.4658</td>
<td>0.4966</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 4: (3,0,3,0)</td>
<td>0.3633</td>
<td>0.3948</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>0.3743</td>
<td>0.3974</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 5: (0,1,0,1)</td>
<td>0.8384</td>
<td>1.1332</td>
<td>35.16</td>
<td>0.9171</td>
<td>1.1918</td>
<td>29.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 6: (0,2,0,2)</td>
<td>0.7352</td>
<td>1.0690</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>0.8187</td>
<td>1.1580</td>
<td>41.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 7: (0,3,0,3)</td>
<td>0.6436</td>
<td>0.9674</td>
<td>50.31</td>
<td>0.7229</td>
<td>1.0680</td>
<td>47.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 8: (0,1,1,0)</td>
<td>0.7479</td>
<td>0.8949</td>
<td>19.66</td>
<td>0.8008</td>
<td>0.9267</td>
<td>15.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 9: (0,2,2,0)</td>
<td>0.6478</td>
<td>0.7811</td>
<td>20.58</td>
<td>0.7056</td>
<td>0.8273</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 10: (0,3,3,0)</td>
<td>0.5656</td>
<td>0.6811</td>
<td>20.42</td>
<td>0.6239</td>
<td>0.7327</td>
<td>17.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 11: (1,2,2,1)</td>
<td>0.6331</td>
<td>0.8171</td>
<td>29.06</td>
<td>0.6851</td>
<td>0.8596</td>
<td>25.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 12: (1,3,3,1)</td>
<td>0.5758</td>
<td>0.7451</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>0.6276</td>
<td>0.7919</td>
<td>26.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>line 13: (1,4,4,1)</td>
<td>0.5252</td>
<td>0.6788</td>
<td>29.25</td>
<td>0.5760</td>
<td>0.7271</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 8

14
As is clearly seen, the overestimation of the true SCR is moderate for left skewed risk distributions (where formula (1) produces a severe underestimation), but certainly unacceptably high for right skewed distributions. Similarly, the modified table 5 reads:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>SCR$_{\delta}(\alpha)$</th>
<th>SCR$^{+}(\alpha)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
<td>0.8585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5960</td>
<td>0.9800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error in %</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.9293</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6167</td>
<td>0.9900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error in %</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.18</td>
<td>37.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 9

The same effect as before is visible here: the overestimation error decreases for “upper positively” dependent risks (case [1]), while the converse is true for “upper negatively” dependent risks (case [3]).

It should be finally mentioned that comparable results to those in sections 2 to 5 hold true under the (throughout coherent) risk measure TVaR, see e.g. Straßburger (2006), Chapter 7.

A pragmatic way out of the problems outlined so far does not seem to be easy; a solution might be to allow the classical formula (1) only for certain classes of risk distributions (or lob’s) where such severe misspecifications typically do not occur, while formula (35) should be applied in all other cases.

Appendix

The following table shows the expanded cdf’s for the individual risks with density given by (5), for some selected parameters, in the range $0 \leq x \leq 1$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(n, m)$</th>
<th>$F_{\delta}(x; n, m) = \int_{0}^{x} f_{\delta}(u) , du$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0,0)</td>
<td>$x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,0)</td>
<td>$x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2,0)</td>
<td>$x^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,0)</td>
<td>$x^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0,1)</td>
<td>$-x^3 + 2x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0,2)</td>
<td>$x^4 - 3x^2 + 3x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0,3)</td>
<td>$-x^4 + 4x^3 - 6x^2 + 4x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,2)</td>
<td>$3x^4 - 8x^3 + 6x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,3)</td>
<td>$-4x^5 + 15x^4 - 20x^3 + 10x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,4)</td>
<td>$5x^6 - 24x^5 + 45x^4 - 40x^3 + 15x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2,1)</td>
<td>$-3x^4 + 4x^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,1)</td>
<td>$-4x^5 + 5x^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,1)</td>
<td>$-5x^6 + 6x^5$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 10
The next table shows the cdf’s for the aggregated risk for some selected parameter choices. Note that the corresponding densities \( f_s(x; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) \) can be easily obtained from this by differentiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( (n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) )</th>
<th>[ F_s(x; n_1, m_1, n_2, m_2) ]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( (1,0,1,0) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{6}x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (2,0,2,0) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{20}x^5 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (3,0,3,0) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{70}x^7 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,1,0,1) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{6}x^5 - \frac{4}{3}x^3 + 2x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,2,0,2) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{20}x^6 - \frac{3}{5}x^4 + 3x^2 - 6x^3 + \frac{9}{2}x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,3,0,3) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{70}x^8 - \frac{8}{35}x^7 + \frac{8}{5}x^5 - \frac{32}{5}x^4 + 14x^3 - 16x^2 + 8x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,0,0,0) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{2}x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,1,1,0) )</td>
<td>[ -\frac{1}{6}x^5 + \frac{2}{3}x^3 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,2,2,0) )</td>
<td>[ \frac{1}{20}x^6 - \frac{3}{10}x^4 + \frac{3}{4}x^2 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (0,3,3,0) )</td>
<td>[ -\frac{1}{70}x^8 + \frac{4}{35}x^7 - \frac{2}{5}x^5 + \frac{4}{5}x^3 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (1,2,2,1) )</td>
<td>[ -\frac{9}{70}x^9 + \frac{36}{35}x^8 - \frac{14}{5}x^6 + \frac{12}{5}x^4 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (1,3,3,1) )</td>
<td>[ -\frac{4}{63}x^{10} + \frac{40}{63}x^9 - \frac{5}{2}x^8 - \frac{100}{21}x^7 + \frac{10}{3}x^6 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (1,4,4,1) )</td>
<td>[ -\frac{25}{924}x^{12} + \frac{25}{77}x^{11} - \frac{23}{14}x^{10} + \frac{95}{21}x^9 - \frac{195}{28}x^8 + \frac{30}{7}x^7 ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab. 11
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References


