

Winfried Boeder

**A Note on the Pragmatics of Interrogativity in Megrelian<sup>1</sup>**

The modest goal of this paper is to present a few informal observations on certain types of Megrelian interrogative sentences, their pragmatic properties and some diachronic considerations that we may derive from them.

I dedicate this note to the memory of Togo Gudava, who taught me Megrelian in 1974 and whom I adored as one of the best teachers I had ever had. I appreciated his excellent professionalism as a linguist and sophisticated expert of his mother tongue, and I liked the warmth of his charming personality. His early death was a great loss for Georgian linguistics.

1. Syntax was not the main interest of Togo Gudava, but I owe him an etymology that is quite important for the history of Kartvelian.<sup>2</sup> He told me that Megrelian *na-mu-* corresponds to Georgian *ro-mel-* (with *\*-mel > mu*<sup>3</sup> and *na-* as a functional equivalent of Georgian *ro- < \*ra*<sup>4</sup>). This shows that there is not only a pervasive interrogative word strategy of subordination that Megrelian shares with Georgian and Svan and which distinguishes Kartvelian from the other Caucasian languages (Rogava 1948), but also an isogloss connecting both the interrogative pronouns *romel-* with *namu-* ‘which’ and the Megrelian conjunction *na-mu-da* with the late Old Georgian conjunction *ro-mel*. The final particle *-da* seems to be the same as e.g. *-da* in result clauses (2), in conditional clauses (3), in *tu ara da* ‘if not’ etc. Note that in all these cases *-da* occurs at the right edge of the preceding tone group (Boeder 2005, cf. Tevdoraḡe 1978:46) and that Makar Khubua (= X) faithfully marks these junctures against the rules of conventional punctuation (see eg. (25b)):<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Nino Dobordjginidze and Rezo Kiknadze (both Tbilisi) for helpful native speaker judgments on Georgian material; to Ivane Lejava and Maia Lomia for questions of Megrelian prosody; to Lali Ezugbaia for a detail of Laz; and to Taia Tskhadaia and Paata Tskadaia (all Tbilisi) for information on lexical, morphological and semantic matters of Megrelian. They should not be held responsible for mistakes and misunderstandings. The Georgian translations I owe to Anton Kiziria (†) and Rezo Sherozia (Tbilisi/Zugdidi).

<sup>2</sup> I cannot exclude the possibility that this etymology has since been published by somebody else.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Georgian *cmel-* ‘fat’ = Megrelian *cəmu* ‘id.’ (Gamqrelize, Mačavariani 1965:89; 1982:39). The identification of *-mu* with the third person pronoun *mu-* ‘what?’ (Marṭirosovi 1964:190; cp. Čikobava 1936:84: „ნა- პლეს მესამე პირის სახელი მუ/მუქ (ნამუ = რა-ვის)“) strikes me as very strange.

<sup>4</sup> *ro- < ra-* is the communis opinio. In view of forms like *ra-me-tu* I do not feel very comfortable with it. – The identification of *na-* with the first element of Laz *na-k* ‘where?’, *na-ḡo* ‘how many?’ (Čikobava 1944:450 apud Marṭirosovi 1964:187) and the Kartvelian variation between Georgian *ra-*, Laz *na-*, Megrelian *mu-* and Svan *ma-* ‘what?’ call for a critical scrutiny.

<sup>5</sup> In the following, interlinear glosses will be given only for some examples to facilitate an understanding of the argument.

- (1) xençipeša apu moçineli namu-da, / tito ðoçi daxvamiluas ate merçkineli adgilsie (X 12,2-3)  
king.to he.has informed.NOM that, / each man.NOM  
he.should.make.him.meet.with.him this appointed place.DAT-QUOT  
‘It [sc. the dragon] has sent an instruction to the king / that he should send [one] man each [at a time] to meet it at this appointed place (ხელმწიფისთვის აქვს შეთვლილი, რომ თითო კაცი დაახვედროს ამ მიზნის ადგილას)’
- (2) kurgom tižgura balaveri kuguḡunū namə-da, / mutuns vemnarte (X 86,13-14)  
around such foundation.NOM AFF.she.brought.it.around that / anything.DAT NEG.  
it.can.enter.it  
‘She enclosed it with such a foundation (?) that / nothing can enter it (ორგვლივ ისეთი რამე შემოაყოლა, რომ ვერაფერი ვერ შევა)’
- (3) (a) ma tik va-ren-o va-dmaragu-a-da, / (b) mažia minutis dudi meḡvati-a (X 1,23-24)  
(a) I that.ERG NEG-is-Q NEG-it.was.possible.for.me.to.overthrow.him-QUOT-if /  
(b) second minute.DAT head.NOM you.cut.it.off.for.me-QUOT  
‘(a) If I hadn’t managed to throw him over, (b) the next moment you would have cut my throat, he said (მე ის თუ ვერ წავაქციე, მეორე წუთში თავი მომჭერიო)’

The provenance of Kartvelian relative and conjunctive clauses from grammaticalised interrogative sentences (which seems to be a contact-induced phenomenon) is a fascinating problem, but in the following sections we will not deal with the reconstruction of the early stages of Kartvelian. We will rather try to understand the internal development of some specific Megrelian interrogative constructions.

2. Megrelian has the two basic types of question clauses we know from other languages: questions with interrogative pronouns (4) and yes/no questions marked by the post-verbal clitic particle *-o* (5)-(6).<sup>6</sup> The verb marked by *-o* can be followed by same-clause constituents (7)-(8). Note that *-o* occurs in the same slot as the clause-final conditional subordinator *-da* (as in (1c), (3a)) and the general subordinator *-ni* (as in (8)). *-o*, *-ni* and *-da* may be preceded by the quotative particle *-a*: *reki-a-v-o?* in (6), (9); *kəmortu-a-da* (X 183,33) ‘if he came, he said’, *miçii-a-ni* (Kažaia s.v. *-a*) ‘when you told me, s/he said’.

- (4) **min** orek si? (X 70,25)  
who.NOM you.are you  
‘Who are you?’
- (5) midartu-**o**?  
‘Did s/he go (there)?’
- (6) nasurepi ko-reki-a-v-**o**? (X 41,20)

<sup>6</sup> As a result of regular ellipsis, *-o* occurs in other positions (after phrasal sentence-fragments): *xete kimgeçonu-o art žirapat? – art žirapat-o? ara* (Gippert 2010:373) immediately AFF.it.pleased.you-Q one seeing.INSTR? – one seeing.INSTR-Q? no ‘Did you like it at first sight? – At first sight? No’. Cf. Kařozia et al. 2010:306.

- having.learned.NOM AFF-you.are-QUOT-J-Q  
‘Are you educated?’
- (7) *doxaši-o do dozadi-o lebia?* (X 191,28)  
you.cooked.it-Q and you.seasoned.it-Q *lobio.NOM*  
‘Did you cook and season the beans?’
- (8) *kāçqek-o, artik mažira žoyori kimi?unə-n* (X 97,29)  
AFF.you.see.it-Q, one.ERG second dog.NOM AFF.it.brought.it.here-SUB  
‘Do you see that one dog brought the other here?’
- (9) *si čkimi komonži va-reki-a-v-o? – ko-v-a – uçū kočk* (X 86,29)  
you my husband.NOM NEG-you.are-QUOT-J-Q – AFF-J-QUOT – he.told.her man-  
ERG  
‘[A wife is unsure if the man who returns after a long time of absence is her  
husband. She asks him:] Are you not my husband? – Yes, said the man (შენ ჩემო  
ქმარი არა ხარო? – კიო უთხრა კაცმა)’

Now consider “rhetorical questions” in Megrelian. Their basic form does not differ from ordinary questions. For instance, out of context, (9) can either be read as an ordinary question or as a rhetorical question.<sup>7</sup> In the given context, it is a negative non-rhetorical question with a positive bias (i.e. a positive answer is expected). As a rhetorical question it would mean that the positive value of the implicit “answer” is considered to be evident (see below).<sup>8</sup>

In addition, “classical” rhetorical questions show the usual polarity reversal (negative question ~ strong positive assertion, positive question ~ strong negative assertion). The following examples have a negative interpretation (“who” ~ “nobody” (10), “when” ~ “never” (11); cp. (26d)):

- (10) *aba mi ?ope uyuru?* (X 29,4)  
now who.NOM s/he.was.PERF immortal?  
‘Well, who has ever been immortal?’ = “Nobody has ever been immortal”
- (11) *mužansi rdu ma si goxvarudi-n* (Kartozia et al. 2010:391)  
when it.was I you I.helped.you-SUB  
‘When was it that I helped you?’ = “I have never helped you”

<sup>7</sup> However, specific properties of rhetorical questions cannot be excluded. For instance, stress pattern and intonation contour may be different. In the absence of any study of Megrelian intonation, the question cannot be settled here.

<sup>8</sup> In their chapter on negative forms with a positive meaning G. Kartozia and his co-authors (Kartozia et al. 2010:391-392) deal with the non-rhetorical variant: *tina va-rdu-o ma vo?vilape-n, munero getelə kini do vara sole mortu-a? gečvirū xelmčəpek* (X 55,28-30) that.NOM NEG-he.was-Q I I.let.somebody.kill.him-SUB, how he.became.whole again and from.where he.came-QUOT? he.was.astonished king.ERG ‘Is that not the man I ordered to be killed? How did he come back to life again and from where did he come, the king wondered’ (ის არ იყო, მე რომ მოვაკვლევინე, როგორ გაცოცხლდა („გამბრთელდა“) კვლავ, ანდა საიდან მოვიდა? – გაიკვირვა ხელმწიფემ). This is probably a **question** with a positive bias and does not have the value of a positive **assertion** of what is evident. The translation „ნამდვილად ის იყო, მე რომ მოვაკვლევინე“ (ib. 392) seems to assume a rhetorical question.

- (12) čki voret dinapili-ni tina va-bayudu-a-v-o! (X 3,37)  
 we we.are lost.NOM-SUB that.NOM NEG-it.was.sufficient-QUOT-J-Q  
 ‘[What misfortune led you here!] Was it not enough that we are lost? they said’

The following negative questions have the same formal properties as ordinary rhetorical questions. As far as I can see, they occur only as main clauses; they are comparable to the negative question in (9), and as in (7)-(8), the verb+o can be followed by all kinds of constituents (underlined in (16)-(24)), even in the case of idiomatic expressions, as in (23)-(24). Note that a dependent clause may follow (as in (24)), although the scope of the particle is the whole sentence. However, these negative questions (italicised in the following examples) have a meaning that differs from ordinary rhetorical questions. This specific meaning is provisionally left out of account in the English translation of the following examples.<sup>9</sup> The negative particle *va*, the affirmative particle *k(o)* and the interrogative particle *-o* are boldfaced.

- (13) xençape, mu ragadi oķo, es vemečandu-o (X 151,18-19)  
 king.NOM, what.NOM speaking.NOM it.is.necessary, this.DAT  
 NEG.he.would.give.it.to.him-Q  
 ‘[The king asks Giorgi what he wants and offers him half his kingdom. Giorgi answers that he wants not his kingdom but a horse.] *It goes without saying that the king would give it to him* (ხელმწიფე, რა თქმა უნდა, ამას არ მისცემდა?!)’
- (14) (a) mertə e osurk (b) do zires artiani-n, (c) **va** kičines-o? (X 145,8)  
 (a) she.went.there this woman.ERG (b) and they.saw.them each.other.NOM-SUB, (c)  
 NEG AFF.they.recognized.them-Q  
 ‘[A woman recognizes the ring of her husband, from whom she had been separated for a long time, and asks her son where to find the man who had given him the ring. Her son says: There he is!] (a) This woman went there, (b) and when they saw each other, (c) *they recognized [each other]* (მივიდა ის ქალი და რომ ნახეს ერთმანეთი, [განა] ვერ იცნეს?)’
- (15) (a) muši simonķati ate markinek pārķi-šoro **va** kigexorcku-o. (b) gaocu ir ķočk, mu saķureli-ren (X 1,30-31)  
 (a) his.own weight.INSTR this wrestler.ERG pod-like NEG AFF.he.burst-Q. (b)  
 s/he.was.amazed all man.ERG what.NOM astonishing-it.is  
 ‘[The wrestler laughs at the boy who wants to wrestle with him. The boy seizes and lifts him and when he throws him down.] (a) *The wrestler burst like a pod because of his weight.* (b) Everybody was amazed (მისი სიმძიმით ეს მოჭიდავე პარკივით არ გასკდა? გაოცდა ყველა კაცი, რა საკვირველია)’
- (16) (a) zyvas dinorena mečxome ķatepi-n (b) tenep-k **va-ko**-zires-o kartička! (c) gaķinesə-n, (d) zisnaxe (X 70,9-11)

<sup>9</sup> This type of rhetorical questions occurs in the Georgian standard language, too: *ager ar modis?! just.here not s/he.comes = ager axla modis* ‘look, there s/he comes!’ (ჭობენაზე 1984:166). However, I am not sure if all the Megrelian examples given below have an exact Georgian counterpart.

- (a) sea.DAT they.stand.in.it fisher people.PL.NOM-SUB (b) this.PL-ERG **NEG-AFF**-they-perceived.it-**Q** picture.NOM (c) they.looked.at.it-SUB (d) beautiful.girl.NOM  
 ‘[The girl’s picture fell from the pocket of the vezier’s son into the river and was carried away into the sea.] (a) Some fishermen who stood in the water (b) (*these*) caught sight of the picture, (c) and when they looked at it, (d) [it was] the beautiful girl [i.e. the vizier’s daughter] (ზღვაში რომ დგანან მეთევზე კაცები, ამათ ქე არ ნახეს სურათი? რომ გახედეს, მზისუნახავი)’
- (17) (a) do gvalaše mučo gimelə-n, (b) kvatila **va** uyun-**o** šxurs? (c) kimioçķirə kvatila do meurs (X 174,35-36)  
 ‘[He took the sheep along] (a) and as soon as he came down from the mountain (b) *the sheep had a fat-tail*,<sup>10</sup> (c) he cut off the fat-tail, and he goes on (და მთილამ როგორც კი ჩამოვიდა, ღუმა არა აქვს ცხვარს? მოაჭრა ღუმა და მიღის)’
- (18) (a) žimalenk **va** mortu-**o** onžuas? (b) das ķitxes [...] (X 131,3-4)  
 ‘[The enamoured sister feigns an illness and goes to bed while her brothers are away.] (a) *Her brothers came [home] in the evening*. (b) They asked their sister [...] (ძმები არ მოვიდნენ საღამოს? დას კითხეს [...])’
- (19) ate bayanepi vena?otu-**o** te osurk çqars? (X 144,20)  
 ‘[By deceit the evil woman has arranged a new marriage for the children’s father.] *This woman threw these children away into a river* (ეს ბავშვები არ ჩააგდო ამ ქალმა მდინარეში?)’
- (20) (a) xencəpeši skuak molartə dasuro (b) do **va-kəmortu-**o**** te ciraši mumaša (X 70,12-13)  
 ‘[After he had got back the girl’s picture which had been recovered from the sea (cp. (16)),] (a) the king’s son indeed set out (b) *and came to the father of this girl* [i.e. to the vezier, to ask him for her hand] (ხელმწიფის შვილი წამოვიდა მართლა და ქე არ მოვიდა ამ გოგოს მამასთან)’
- (21) (a) atak mučo kore-n, (b) tenenk **va** geegu-**o**, (c) ate žgiri skua ?unsə-n tek! (X 175,8-9)  
 (a) here that AFF.is-Sub, (b) these.ERG NEG they.understood.it-Q, (c) this good child.NOM it.has.it-SUB this.ERG  
 ‘[For a week, the man works very hard and does everything in a family.] (b) *These [people] came to know* (a) *that he is here* [in their neighbourhood and is such a good worker], (c) this [other family] who has the good daughter [who everybody wants to marry] (აქ რომ არის, ამათ არ გაიგეს, ეს კარგი შვილი რომ ჰყავს, ამაღ)’
- (22) čķua **vo** uyun-**o** kočiši! (X 139,9-10)  
 ‘[The woman who had been transformed into a cow took the basket with her horn and hung it up on the fence.] *She has the intelligence of a human being* (ჭკუა არა აქვს კაცის?)’
- (23) (a) breli šoriša korena uliri (b) do ate xvamardiši unčaši reizis **va** kā?ū-**o** gurk te osuriša (X 75,23-24)

<sup>10</sup> In spite of Khubua’s punctuation, I understand (b) as a parenthesis and (a) as a clause depending on (c) as a main clause.

- (a) [A queen wants to see her father again and departs with a ship.] (a) [When] they had gone very far, (b) [“and”] *the chief captain of this ship desired the woman* [“heart was made towards this woman”] (კარგა შორს კი არიან წასული და ამ ზომალდის უფროსს მოუწდა ეს ქალი)’
- (24) (a) *ase te kočk vo uču-o guri*, (b) *mučo te čxou mudga ren šxvaneri en* (X 139,28-29)  
 ‘[The husband comes home with a cow that shows a strangely intelligent behaviour (see (22)). His daughter tells him that his wife had gone to bring him his meal but did not return.] (a) *Now this man understood* [“gave heart”] (b) *that this cow is something different* (ახლა ეს კაცი ქე არ მიხვდა, რომ ეს ძროხა რაღაც სხვა-ნაირი არის?)’

My tentative conjecture is that in these negative questions the speaker **presumes** a knowledge of the addressee which is not in focus. The addressee is presumed a) to have anticipated the possibility of the event<sup>11</sup> described in the negative question, and b) to have assessed its probability on the basis of his/her knowledge of the previous context, of typical properties of human beings of a certain type, of typical event sequences, and the like.

a) The event has been anticipated as a prospective conjecture. In this perspective, negative questions of this type seem to be in a complementary distribution with evidentials,<sup>12</sup> which are retrospective (inferring the past from the present, as in the Georgian and Megrelian present perfect etc.) or otherwise non-prospective (as in the so-called fourth series of Megrelian and in the “admirative” use expressing a “surprise at a newly discovered and previously **unsuspected** fact” (Friedman 1988: 127, emphasis mine; Boeder 2000: 288), as in Georgian: *ra kai kaci čopilxar!* what.NOM good man.NOM you.have.been.PERF ‘What a good man you are! [I had **not** anticipated this fact]’).

b) The event has been considered to be probable or improbable (epistemic modality), and the degree of the anticipated probability correlates with the degree of surprise connected with the actual occurrence of the event: the higher the degree of its anticipated improbability, the more surprising will it be (“surprisingly”), and vice versa: the higher the degree of probability, the less surprising will it be. Indeed, “of course” seems to be an appropriate translation in most of the examples given above: “they recognized each other, of course” (14), the woman who had been transformed into a cow retained the intelligence of a human being, of course (22), etc. (see also the expression of high probability and low level of surprise in (13): “it goes without saying”). It is an open question if there is a default option in this dimension: since the improbable is inherently more “newsworthy”, it could perhaps be (or have become?) a standard reading where the probability reading is not evident.<sup>13</sup> However, I feel unable to settle this issue on the basis

<sup>11</sup> “Event” is used here in a general sense: actions, situations, states etc.

<sup>12</sup> Thanks to R. Kiknadze for drawing my attention to a possible connection between evidentiality (Georgian *turme*) and the negative question type discussed here.

<sup>13</sup> T. Tskhadaia’s preliminary impression is that out of context, negated aorist verb questions tend to have a surprise reading, and that the affirmative particle *k(o)*- strengthens this reading (p.c.).

of the examples given above, and an adequate description must be left to the intuition of the native speakers.<sup>14</sup>

c) The event can be desirable or not (attitudinal modality). Accordingly, the negative clause can express that the event was hoped for or that it was feared and the like. While this is a relevant aspect of textual understanding, I will not consider its impact here.

The expression of presumed anticipation is related to, but not identical with, the “classical” concept of rhetorical questions. “Classical” rhetorical questions affect the addressee through the blatant contrast between the fact that the truth of its proposition is evident (Lausberg 1963 § 445) and the preparatory condition for questions as speech acts (namely that the speaker does not know the answer). While the Megrelian construction in (13)-(24) resembles “classical” rhetorical questions in that it is not used to ask for information,<sup>15</sup> but to involve the addressee by appealing to some common knowledge, it differs from it by the kind of knowledge that is assumed to be given: it is not the knowledge of the event which is assumed to be familiar and evident to the addressee, but the knowledge that the event described in the negative question was anticipated as possible. This knowledge could be supplied by inference (a king who is ready to give somebody half of his kingdom will also be ready to give him a horse (13)) or from general world knowledge (that it is probable that sheep have fat-tails (17), that people come home from work in the evening (18), that people notice if their neighbours’ man proves to be a good workman (21); that it is improbable that a small picture floating in the sea will be noticed (16), etc.). Note that the probability assessment and the interpretation of the negative clause are controlled by the “background knowledge” of speaker and hearer: that a little picture floating in the sea will be noticed (16) may be improbable for us, but if people are used to expect extraordinary events of this type in specific structural positions of a fairy-tale, it may be taken as a matter of course that the fishermen saw the small picture; that a professional wrestler is defeated by a non-professional boy (15) is improbable, but the story lets us expect an extraordinary feat; and so on.<sup>16</sup>

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Note, however, that the reverse does not hold true: *ko-* occurs in clauses that can hardly be “unexpected”. Cp. (14c), (20b).

<sup>14</sup> [After having completed this paper, I came across the résumé of A. Rostovtsev-Popiel (2011:204). His example is: *do va-momortu-o* and NEG-he.came-Q ‘and do you think he did not come?’ (“implying that he did and the addressee must be surprised”). His outline of a possible context is that “the addressee has already heard from the speaker that someone had visited him/her to borrow some money, and, in break of decency, came back later again to borrow some more”. This surprise reading could be due to an “improbability assessment”, but note that “combining the uncombinable” (to use the author’s title) may also result from irony: presenting something that is unforeseen as expected could produce an additional “rhetorical” effect. The problem certainly deserves an in-depth examination.]

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *non sciscitandi gratia assumitur sed instandi* (Quintilianus 9,2,7) ‘it is adopted not to ask for information, but to press upon somebody’ – contrary to the sincerity condition of “normal” questions. – This is a very simplified concept of rhetorical questions, but I hope it will perhaps do for the present purpose.

<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the attitudinal evaluation of a sentence like: *I was walking in the street – and didn’t I see Giorgi?* may cause happiness or distress depending on individual premises and the context (T. Tskhadaia).

If “classical” rhetorical questions are basic (given that they are cross-linguistically more common), then we may assume that the specific Megrelian use of (negative) questions is the result of an extension from a form of immediate givenness (of what is evident) to a form of indirect givenness (of what is inferred) which requires an additional pragmatic operation.

There is a partially fixed expression that probably belongs here: *vareno* ‘isn’t it?’ (as in (3a), *varduo* ‘wasn’t it?’ (as in: *si mut va-rdu-o ko-miçi-ni, irpeli martali ʔope* (X 18,5) you what.NOM NEG-it.was-Q AFF-you.told.me-SUB, all.NOM right.NOM it.was.PERF ‘Everything you told me was obviously correct’). If indeed it is restricted to subordinate clauses, it seems to be in a complementary distribution with the negated main clause questions discussed in this section and possibly shares their specific meaning. However, its specific pragmatic and prosodic properties (atonic position after the first stressed constituent?) remain to be examined. (For the time being see Lomia 2005:165-168; Զափოზია et al. 2010:392-393).<sup>17</sup>

3. As in many other languages, wh-questions followed by their “answer” have a specific pragmatic meaning. Consider the following examples (the relevant constituents are **e** underlined).

- (25) (a) *minilu boši-k dinaxale*. (b) *ziru mara, mu ziru!* (c) *irpeli zvirpasi sakonel-ep-it epša koren* (X 3,16)  
 (a) he.went.inside young.man-ERG inside. (b) he.saw.something but, what.NOM he.saw.it! (c) everything.NOM precious good-PL-INSTR full.NOM AFF.it.is  
 ‘(a) The young man went inside. (b) He saw something, but what did he see! (c) Everything is full of precious things (შევიდა ბიჭი შიგნით. ნახა მაგრამ, რა ნახა! ყველაფერი ძვირფასი საქონელებით სავსე ქე არის)’<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Ketevan Lomtadize (Lomtadize 1946:342-343) deals with a similar negated construction in the Gurian dialect of Georgian which is restricted to subordinate clauses: *ikidan k’ar dabrundebá, mašin unda ikitxo misi ambavi* there.from AFF-NEG s/he.will.return, then it.is.necessary that.you.ask his/her tale.NOM ‘when/as soon as s/he returns from there, you must ask him/her about his/her news’, with the affirmative particle plus negation preceding the verb and a “sharply rising intonation” on the right edge of the subordinate clause (-á). Lomtadize’s description of the subordinate clause is quite similar to the one given above for Megrelian main clauses: these clauses point to a situation “which is already known to the interlocutors” (მათში იგულისხმება იმ ვითარების მითითება, რაც თანამოსაუბრებისათვის უკვე ცნობილია) (p. 344). “Such an utterance would be impossible, if we didn’t know.” She calls this property “determinedness” (განსაზღვრული ბუნება) and compares it with the meaning of definite articles. It seems to be necessary to differentiate between presupposition and “anticipation” in the sense described above. – Lomtadize’s paper is often cited, but I am not aware of any detailed and systematic study of this phenomenon.

<sup>18</sup> Compare a similar passage from a Svan fairy-tale: *zurāl ačād lančavālte. anṭāx āgite-j im xosgdi: miča yārib kor ṭetilšv gveši li* (Šaniže, Topuria (edd.) 1939:381,14) ‘The woman went out to chat. She came back home, and what does she see? Her poor house is filled with good things’. In Svan story-telling, this form seems to be less common than in Megrelian. (Is it a calque of the Megrelian idiom?)

- (26) (a) *gamḵaḵu ḵari* (b) *do minaḵinu dinaxale-ni*, (c) *ḵiru mara mu ḵiru*, – (d) *mus ziruns ḵoḵiḵi toli enepiḵi uḵḡuḵis*: - (e) *sumi angilozi ḡgua osurskualepi koxenan do koyurḵulana* (X 3,33-36)  
 ‘(a) He opened the door, (b) and when he looked inside, (c) he saw something, but what did he see! (d) Man’s eye doesn’t see anything better than that [“what.DAT it.sees.it man.GEN eye.NOM that.PL.GEN better.DAT”]: (e) Three angellike young women sit there and are chatting [“twittering”] (გამოიღო კარი და რომ შეიხედა შიგნით, ნახა მაგრამ რა ნახა – რას ნახავს კაცის თვალი იმათზე უკეთესს: - სამი ანგელოზის მსგავსი ქალიშვილი (ქე) სხედან და ჭიკჭიკებენ)’
- (27) (a) *tek gerḵkindu ndikit*. (b) *erḵkindu mara muk erḵkindu?* (c) *tolk toliḶa vagaḵeminu boḶis* (X 4,29-30)  
 ‘(a) There a dev appeared, too. (b) He appeared, but what was it that appeared? (c) The young man was unable to fix his eye on his (იქ გაჩნდა ღვეცი. გაჩნდა მაგრამ რა გაჩნდა? თვალი თვალს ვერ გაუსწორა ბიჭმა)’
- (28) (a) *duḵḶes gurapa*. (b) *iḡis mara, muk iḡis!* (c) *keḡaniḶ gasaḵvirk* (X 70,4-5)  
 (a) They began to teach [the two children]. (b) Something became of them, but what became of them! (c) Something that astounded everyone [sc. became of them] (დაუწვეეს სწავლება. შეიქნენ მაგრამ, რა შეიქნენ! ქვეყნის გასაკვირი)’
- (29) *kəḶiḶḶ boḶik Ḷieba, mara muḶi?* (X 77,15)  
 AFF.he.began.it young.man.ERG telling.NOM, but what.GEN?  
 ‘The young man began to tell [a story to the monk], but on what? [He told him the story about his, the monk’s, treachery in the form of a fairy-tale, and the monk listens to him.] (დაიწყო ბიჭმა საუბარი, მაგრამ რისი?)’

The following properties of this construction are of interest here:

a) It consists of two co-ordinate clauses conjoined by “but”, where the second clause is a question followed by its “answer”:

[X<sub>i</sub> - but what (+ X<sub>i</sub>) ?] – “answer”

where X is a verb. Its second occurrence can be omitted (by conjunction reduction), as in (29). The first co-ordinate clause (with the exception of (29)) is incomplete: its non-anaphorical object is not specified (it is clumsily translated here by “something” = “it” without antecedent), although it is not “commanded” by its second occurrence.

b) X is a narrative verb form (in the aorist or the historical present). It often denotes a perception (“to see”, “to appear”, “to become (apparent)”), but other, semantically related, verbs with complements suitable for an “answer” occur as well (“to become (apparent)” (28), “to tell” = “to disclose” (29)).

c) The construction differs from most rhetorical questions in that the relevant “answer” is supplied by the speaker himself, and need not be derived by assigning a polar value to its proposition. In this, the structure is similar to so-called expository questions which the author proceeds to answer himself: *What are the main objections to this approach? First...* (Sperber, Wilson 1986:251). The wh-question and its answer, then, belong to the same speaker. In other words, they show no turn-taking (i.e. no transition from one speaker to the other). Rather, they are first and second parts of an adjacency pair, without being dialogic.

d) On the other hand, this “monologic” use shows the same forms of ellipsis as dialogic sequences. Compare (28c) with the following Gurian example: *ceviden, mara raper ceviden? – pexšveli!* (Niķolaišvili, to appear) ‘They started, but how did they start? – Barefoot!’

e) It remains to be investigated if the wh-question in this structure has a falling intonation as in its canonical conversational use. The German counterparts of (25)-(29) have a rising intonation: the wh-question behaves like a protasis which is dependent on, but not subordinate to, the “answer” clause. I have no evidence of this intonation in its Megrelian counterpart, but the surmise that it has a rising contour is not improbable.

f) The “answer” (i.e. the apodosis) expresses something that the subject of the wh-question (i.e. the protagonist) did not expect. At the same time, the wh-question has a preparatory function for the addressee: it is a cataphoric device to alert the addressee to the unexpectedness of the subsequent “answer”. The construction postpones the specification of the communicative focus (the object) twice: first by the incompleteness of the first clause, then by the use of a cataphoric wh-question. The conjunction introducing the second clause (“but”) indicates that the communicative point is not that the protagonist saw something but **what** he saw. The lack of newsworthiness of “seeing something” is opposed to the informational load of its answer.

4. Finally, there is a dependent clause type with a marker *-o-* that has attracted the particular attention of kartvelologists over the past decades (Hewitt 1987:142, Harris, Campbell 1995:296, Axalaia 2004:147, Lomia 2005:171-174; Kartožia et al. 2010:396-398).

Firstly, there seems to be one type of conditional clauses which is marked by the clause-final interrogative marker *-o-*. The only example I am aware of is the one provided by Giorgi Rogava (1948:366):

- (30) *komučan-o dogirtunank*  
you.will.give.it.to.me-Q I.will.turn.it.back.to.you  
‘If you give it to me, I’ll give it back to you’

The dearth of material prevents me from discussing this form in detail, but it should be obvious that it parallels conditional clauses which developed from “verificational” yes-no-questions (“Vergewissungsfragen”, Hofmann 1936:109 §103) in many languages (Boeder 1993-94:35; 39) – but probably not in Georgian.<sup>19</sup> The Megrelian conditional clause in (30) could be a calque: in Turkish, the interrogative post-verbal clitic *-mi* has the same function (Lewis 1975: 267).

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<sup>19</sup> Old Georgian seems to avoid constructions like (30). Cp. the Greek original: *dédesai gunaikí? mè: zé:tei lúsin* (I Cor. 7,27) ‘Art thou bound unto a wife? Seek not to be loosed’ with the conjunctive construction in: *še-tu-qopil xar colsa, nu ganuḡveb* ‘if you are bound to a wife, do not let her go’. - Georgian asyndetic conditional clauses are inconclusive in the variants that lack the interrogative article *-a*: *tetr žuas gaxsni, tetri řanisamosit, iarayit da cxenit iknebi gam[o]çqobili* (Bleichsteiner 1919:122) ‘If you detach a white horse-hair [white horse-hair.DAT you.will.detach.it], you will be equipped with a white shirt, weapon and horse’. I have no example of a conditional clause from the Mountain dialects that have interrogative *-a*.

Second, there is a formally identical clause type in the following examples:

- (31) (a) *mertes-o* – (b) *miḡ-miḡi kugurena ḡata* (c) *do mudgareni ḡamals getkaḡirana xaniṣ skuas* (X 15,32)  
 ‘[Everywhere they looked for the khan’s son and came to some place.] (a) When they went there, (b) [they saw:] people are standing around in a circle (c) and bandage up the khan’s son with some remedy (რომ მივიდნენ, ირგვლივ დგანან ხალხი და რაღაცა წამალს უხვევენ ხანის შვილს).’
- (32) (a) *uṣines-o* – (b) *art ḡoc didi ṣxuriṣ kudi kigiote* (X 69,14-15)  
 ‘[On the fourth day they went there.] (a) When they looked, (b) [they saw:] a man has a large sheep-skin cap on him (რომ უყურეს, კაცს დიდი ცხვრის ქუდი ახურავს)’
- (33) (a) *samarḡvanoṣe miḡaḡinu-o*, (b) *ḡiḡe oxvameḡgura ḡude koḡiru* (X 3,32-33)  
 ‘(a) When he looked over from the right side, (b) he saw a little shrine-like house (მარჯვნიდან რომ გაიხედა, პატარა სალოცავის მსგავსი სახლი ნახა)’
- (34) (a) *kimertə osurk* (b) *do gamnāḡḡe ṣkartuni-o*, (c) *muṣi cira skualepi ḡurelo koḡirə* (X 78,26-27)  
 ‘(a) His wife went there, (b) and when she pulled the cover away, (c) she saw her daughters dead (მივიდა ცოლი და რომ გადახადა საბანი, თავისი ქალიშვილები მკვდარი ნახა)’
- (35) (a) *kimert xoloṣa-v-o*, (b) *a, muṣi delmaxoreṣi osuri* (X 17,8-9)  
 (a) *he.went near.to-J-Q*, (b) *lo!*, *his.own neighbour.GEN wife.NOM*  
 ‘(a) When he got closer, (b) here [is] his neighbour’s wife! (რომ მივიდა ახლოს, აი მისი მეზობლის ცოლი)’
- (36) (a) *spiḡkas munṡu-o*, (b) *ḡoḡepi dinoḡḡar dudi ḡvatili* (X 40,24-25 *apud Kaḡaia s.v. -o*)  
 (a) *match.DAT she.set.on.fire-Q* (b) *man.PL.NOM they.are.laid.down head cut.off. NOM*  
 ‘(a) When she struck a match, (b) [she saw:] the men are stretched out with their heads cut off (ასანთს რომ მოუკიდა, [ნახა / რას ხედავს?] კაცები ჩაწყობილია / აწყვია თავმოჭრილი)’
- (37) (a) *boṣiḡ eṣelə do giḡinu-o*, (b) *va kiḡinu-o ḡyabi* (X 134,24<sup>20</sup>)  
 (a) *young.man.ERG he.came.up and he.looked-Q*, (b) *NEG he.recognized.her-Q girl.NOM*  
 ‘[The young man was pulled out of a well.] (a) When the young man came up and looked, (b) he recognized the girl [“didn’t he recognize the girl?”] [with whom he had spent three days and three nights] (ბიḡი რომ ამოვიდა და გაიხედა, არ იცნო გოგო?)’

a) On the basis of example (37), the particle *-o* in these clauses has been identified with the interrogative particle *-o*.<sup>21</sup> If we take this identity for granted, the *-o*-clause

<sup>20</sup> The location and the wording of this passage are wrong and incomplete in Abesaze 1963:18, and hence in Hewitt 1987:142, Harris,Campbell 1995:296 and Axalaia 2004:147.

construction can be considered to be the result of a reanalysis: the question clause followed by its “answer” could be analysed as a dependent clause by assigning *-o* to the same slot as, for instance, the clause-final general subordinator *-ni*.

b) Note, however, that the position of *-o* in dependent clauses differs from the position of the post-verbal *-o* interrogative marker. 1) As we saw above (2.), the latter, but not the former, may be followed by same-clause constituents.<sup>22</sup> This restriction results from the fact that the dependent *-o*-clause has lost its main-clause privilege (which allows a less restricted word order). In (8), the scope of *-o* is the whole sentence, in (31)-(37) it is only the clause in which it occurs. 2) In the dependent clause, *-o* is in a final position, like the subordinator *-ni* in (14b) and (26b), but not (necessarily) post-verbal (see (35)). The reanalysis presupposes an interpretation of the original post-verbal position of *-o* as a clause-final position where the two coincided (as in (9)).

c) This analysis is supported by the fact that *-o* retains the original stress pattern: a dynamic stress falls on the syllable preceding it both in yes/no questions (Qipšizē 1914:092: *rágadans* ‘s/he speaks’ vs. *ragadáns-o* ‘does s/he speak?’, *midártə* ‘s/he went there’ vs. *midartú-o* ‘did s/he go there?’) and in dependent *-o*-clauses (Qarțozia et al. 2010:396: “ințonaciuri maxvili”). At the same time, this persistent stress pattern in *-o*-clauses contrasts with the stress pattern of subordinate clauses with *-da* (in (3)) and *-ni* (in (12), (26b)): although *-o* in dependent clauses occupies the same slot as the subordinator *-ni*, the latter does not have a stress on the penultima like the former: *komórtu-ni* ‘when

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<sup>21</sup> Hewitt (1987:142; similarly Boeder 2005:19). There are other theories. Cikolia (1977:87 apud Qarțozia 2010:397-398; this article is inaccessible to me) suggests the following development: *užinu+ore* ‘s/he looked at it + it.is’ > *užinu-o*. I cannot discuss this hypothesis here, but I should like to mention a few problems: a) In other contexts, the usual reduction of the copula is *ore(n)* > *re*. b) The other particles containing *ore(n)*, e.g. *va-ren-o* ‘NEG-it.is-Q’ (Qarțozia 2010:392-393), have a non-final position (see (3a) and the final paragraph of 2.). c) It is not clear to me what kind of meaning *ore(n)* could contribute to the construction: what is the semantic connection between “it is” and “immediate succession” and “surprise”? An additional argument comes from a contact language of Megrelian, Abkhaz. As pointed out by Hewitt (1984:14; 1987:46), Abkhaz has an exact formal counterpart (a clause-final interrogative particle *-ma* in the protasis) with exactly the same specific meaning. Whatever the direction of code-copying was in this case, Megrelian or Abkhaz speakers must have understood the construction of their respective neighbour language as interrogative. – It may well be that Abkhaz *-ma* is a calque of Megrelian *-o*, just as the use of Megrelian *-da* in echo-questions was perhaps borrowed into Abkhaz (Hewitt 1991).

<sup>22</sup> Therefore the following example is problematic: *eper muk angaziru, / čkimda kixxune-o tina?* (first lines of poem no. 178 in Gudava (ed.) 1975:91) such what.ERG it.has.appeared.to.you / to.me you.preferred.it-Q that.NOM? Axalaia (2004:148) translates: “what did you see (such) that you prefer it to me?”. He seems to interpret the second clause as an asyndetic result clause (with the correlative *eper*: “such (...that...)”). But *-o*-clauses always occur as protases and do not allow postverbal constituents such as *tina*. As it stands, the second clause is a main clause question. – The same applies to the following sentence where the interrogative clause precedes the main clause: *tina va-rdu-o, ma voʔvilapen?* (see footnote 8). Consider also: *ešmaķem-k gogonu-o / kalam tik agičkaru?* (Gudava (ed.) 1975:120) devil.PL-ERG they.inspired.you-Q / pen.NOM that.ERG it.accelerated.it.for.you ‘Did the devils inspire you to take the pen?’ The English translation (Axalaia 1999:538) is appropriate, but it doesn’t render the syntax of this sentence. Again, I understand the second clause as an asyndetic result clause (“so that it ...”).

s/he came' (and not \**komortú-ni*), *kožiru žoyóri-ni* 'when s/he saw the dog' (and not \**kožiru žoyóri-ni*) (Gudava 1969:110). On the other hand, the intonational contour of independent yes-no-questions and of dependent *-o*-clauses differ: while questions have their characteristic pitch movement on the syllable preceding *-o* (Žyenti 1953:195), their dependent clause counterparts probably have not, and behave like subordinate clauses.<sup>23</sup> Lexically conditioned patterns (e.g. the stress patterns of *-o* and *-ni*) seem to persist better than intonational contours, which change as a result of reanalysis (the question being integrated into a sentence as a protasis).

d) *-o*-clauses are considered as temporal clauses (Hewitt 1987:142; similarly Boeder 2005:19).<sup>24</sup> However, the usual syntactic tests do not fare well: *tičkəma* 'then, *ᄁᄁᄁ* etc. could perhaps be substituted for the *-o*-clause (34b) ("then she saw..."), but not e.g. for (32a), (35a). The result of the question-test is even worse: continuing (34) we may try to ask: "(I don't understand:) **When** did his wife see her dead daughters? – When she pulled the cover away." In Megrelian, a similar question can be answered by a temporal clause (as a sentential fragment, as in (38a-c)), but an *-o*-clause (38d) seems to be completely unacceptable.<sup>25</sup>

- (38) (a) *gamnāčə škartuni-ni* (she.pulled.it.away cover.NOM-SUB)  
 (b) *mužams škartuni gamnāčə-ni* (when she.pulled.it.away cover.NOM-SUB)  
 (c) *škartuni gamnāčə do xate* (cover.NOM she.pulled.it.away and then instantly)  
 (d) \**gamnāčə škartuni-o* (she.pulled.it.away cover.NOM-Q)

A possible hypothesis is that constructions with *-o*-clauses are co-ordinate constructions. In this analysis, the *-o*-clause is dependent on its subsequent co-ordinate clause (since it cannot occur without the latter), but it is not subordinate to it. Semantically, it provides a temporal reference point for its subsequent co-ordinate clause (as is shown by the possibility of (38a-c)), but it is not its constituent. Since its intonational contour does not differ from that of subordinate clauses (see section c) above), it remains to be investigated if the first conjunct of Megrelian co-ordinate sentences have the same intonation contour as subordinate clauses preceding their main clause. Note that co-ordinate first conjuncts are similar to subordinate clauses: as in subordinate clauses, they form a protasis with a clause final conjunction and a pause following, rather than preceding it (for Georgian see Tevdoraže 1978:46 and 78; Boeder 2005:19-23). Note the comma in (25b), (28b) and:

- (39) *va-debžeri mara, midamʔon* (X 44,18)  
 NEG-I.believed.it **but**, he.lead.me.away  
 'I didn't believe it, but he took me along (არ დავიჯერე მაგრამ, წამიყვანა)'

<sup>23</sup> Hewitt 1987:142. His observation was confirmed by I. Lejava and M. Lomia (p.c.), with the reservation that the impressionistic observation needs to be substantiated by phonetic research. In a small-scale experiment conducted by M. Lomia, some Megrelian students distinguished the intonational contours of interrogative and temporal clauses, others did not.

<sup>24</sup> Abesaže (1963: 18) and, following her, Lomia (2005:171) confine their discussion to a general description ("hypotaxis"), without specifying the type of adverbial clause they represent.

<sup>25</sup> For these data and their evaluation I am indebted to T. Cxadaia.

If our hypothesis is correct, *-o* parallels *mara* in (39) in marking the first conjunct of a coordinative construction. This would explain the inacceptability of (38d) as an answer.

e) From a pragmatic point of view, dependent *-o*-clauses differ from questions: they have no independent illocutionary force (“question”), and their proposition is presupposed as in subordinate temporal clauses.

f) The meaning of the construction is not just that event B (maybe incidentally) follows event A in immediate succession (“as soon as”), as in the clauses marked by ... *mučō ... n(i)* (see (17a) and (21a), where *-ni* is the clause-final general subordinator and *mučō* ‘as soon as’ (< ‘how?’) specifies the temporal proximity between the events of the clauses).<sup>26</sup>

Firstly, as far as I can judge from a restricted material, the apodosis describes the protagonist’s perception which is contingent on or “prepared” by the action described in the protasis: X’s looking towards Y (as in (32)-(33), (37)) / X’s uncovering Y (as in (34)) / X’s going to Y (as in (31), (35)) / X’s striking a light (as in (36)). These actions enable X to perceive Z. The precondition meaning connects this construction with the conditional meaning in (30). However, it may be an epiphenomenon of temporal succession and of a same-subject constraint (see below).

Second, the *-o*-clause cataphorically signals to the addressee that the event described in the apodosis is unexpected. Specifically, it is unexpected for the protagonist, like the “answers” to the wh-questions described above (3.f). In fact, a paraphrase of the apodosis could be: *ziru mara mu ziru* ‘s/he saw (something), but what did s/he see? +

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<sup>26</sup> The Georgian construction with *tu ara* ‘or not’, which Hewitt (1984:13-14; 1987:141) discusses as an example of a parataxis-based construction, comes closest to the temporal *-o*-clauses of Megrelian: *meore dyes gatenda tu ara, xelmčipem šeirto uncrosi da* (Bleichsteiner 1919:88) second day.DAT it.dawned or NEG, king.ERG he.joined.her younger.NOM sister.NOM ‘The following day, when it dawned, the king married the younger sister at once’. An equivalent of (34b) would be: *gamnāčqə škartuni do varə-ni* she.pulled.it.away cover.NOM and NEG-SUB ‘when she pulled the cover away’, but this form seems to be less natural in Megrelian (T. and P. Tskhadaia, p.c.), and it could be a calque of Georgian: *gadaxada sabani tu ara* she.pulled.it.away cover.NOM or NEG. (It is interesting that this sentence passes the question test of true temporal clauses: *rodis šeirto uncrosi da? – meore dyes gatenda tu ara* ‘(I don’t understand:) **When** did the kind marry the younger sister? – As soon as it dawned the next day’.) While this construction shares the immediate succession meaning with the Megrelian *-o*-clause construction, it does not show its unexpectedness meaning and its explicit or implicit same-subject constraint. In addition, while the Georgian protasis contains the disjunctive question marker *tu*, its Megrelian counterpart - as far as I can see - does not. Compare Georgian *čavida tu ara* ‘barely had s/he gone (when...)’ with its Megrelian counterpart: *midartu vara* ‘s/he.went NEG’ (Žikia 1967:377), without any interrogative element. However, the Megrelian form is close to its Turkish equivalent: *gider gitmez* (Žikia ib.; Harris,Campbell 1995:297; cp. Hewitt 2001:138) s/he.go.AOR s/he.go.NEG.AOR, although it lacks the repeated verb form of Turkish. The Laz form, on the other hand, is an exact calque of the Turkish expression: *idu var-idu-ja-š* (Žikia ib.) s/he.went NEG-s/he.went-QUOT-GEN (where the genitive is the functional equivalent of Megrelian *-ni*). Thus we have similarity cline: Georgian < Megrelian < Laz < Turkish.

apodosis (i.e. the object of ‘to see’).<sup>27</sup> Hewitt (1984:14; 1987:146) rightly points out that “this structure [in the Abkhaz<sup>28</sup> counterpart of the Megrelian construction] still preserves its putatively original expressive character and thus tends to occur only under special circumstances (usually confined to folktales or literature), and this may be captured by employing the archaic and similarly expressive interjection ‘lo!’ at the start of the main clause in the English translation.” Note that *lo* is the standard translation of the Hebrew biblical deictic interjection *w<sup>e</sup>-hinnē* (see Johannesson 1937:179-215, Boeder 1983:291), which produced so many calques in the Christian world: Greek *kai idou*, Old Georgian *da aha esera*, Russian *i se*, Italian *ed ecco*, German *und siehe* etc. Similar to Megrelian *-o*, *w<sup>e</sup>-hinnē* is very often preceded by a “preparatory action”: looking, going to, opening (Johannesson 1937:181). A form with a similar meaning occurs in (35): Megrelian *a* (= Georgian *ai* ‘(look) here’) is a deictic interjection which behaves like a verb of seeing or showing in that it occurs with a “complement”: a noun phrase (as in (35) and (40)-(41)) or a finite-verb clause (as in (42)).

- (40) a skani bircxa! (Q 100,7)  
 here your finger-nail.NOM  
 ‘[He took the finger-nail out of his pocket and said...] Here is your finger-nail!’
- (41) a, skua, uškuri! (Q 92,34)  
 here, child, apple.NOM  
 ‘Here, my daughter, take this apple [and give it to the man you want to marry]!’
- (42) a, baba, atena mideyi (X 195,22)  
 here, father.NOM, this.NOM take.it.away  
 ‘[A hundred roubles he kept for himself and another hundred roubles he gave to his son:] Here, my dear son, take this along [and make reasonable use of it]’

A verb of seeing (in a broad sense) is present in the apodosis of (33b), (34c), (37) and (35) (if we include the deictic particle<sup>29</sup>), but not in (31)-(32), (36). However, there is a clear indication of its presence on the semantic level: (32) does not mean that the man had a hat on when they looked (i.e. the temporal clause determines the point in time when they saw the man, not when the man had a hat on) and specifies the precondition of the act of seeing, and not of the man’s having a hat on. In addition, it is a general feature of narrative texts that the protagonist’s perception is metonymically implied by the expression of what is perceived. (Cp. (16d), where a main-clause verb of seeing is understood: “when they looked at it, [they recognized] the girl”.) The positing of an implicit verb of seeing allows us to formulate a same-subject-constraint: the protagonist is the subject of both the protasis clause and of the explicit or implicit verb of seeing. The (explicit) verb of seeing has a

<sup>27</sup> T. Tskhadaia (p.c.) confirms this: in addition to temporal succession, *-o* signals “astonishment” and “amazement” (*gaoceba*, *gaḱvirveba*)

<sup>28</sup> It is not impossible that the Abkhaz construction is a calque of the Megrelian expression, just as the use of Abkhaz *-da* in echo-questions was probably borrowed from Megrelian (Hewitt 1991).

<sup>29</sup> The deictic particle *a(i)* presupposes a person (a centre of consciousness) who perceives what is expressed by its complement. In (38)-(40) this is the addressee (the subject of “Look!”), but in (35), it is the protagonist.

narrative form with the same restriction on tenses as in the wh-construction (see section 3.b).

g) If *-o* is indeed *-o* is etymologically identical with the interrogative particle, this interpretation has an important advantage: same-speaker question-answer pairs are a good basis for the coding of clause combining, since they form a bi-sentential (non-syntactic) **unit**: an adjacency pair in which the first part (the question) calls for a second part (the answer). This would also explain why *-o*-clauses must precede their main clause.<sup>30</sup> However, the formal argument suffers from a weakness which – *mutatis mutandis* – we know from “root etymologies” whose semantic side is based on a semantically abstract common denominator of items occurring in different words, without the conditions of their divergence being specified. Assuming an extension from questions to dependent clauses does not help us to understand the specificity of the construction and the divergence between question and *-o*-clause. That “questions and dependent clauses share certain logical properties [sc. non-assertiveness] and that this makes extension from one to the other possible” (Harris, Campbell 1995:298) cannot explain the very specific semantic properties of *-o*-clause constructions (see also Hewitt 2001:137). By contrast, consider a construction like:

- (43) *gind meʒinos, mainc sul-ši mizixar* (Grigol Orbeliani)  
even.if I.sleep.AOR.SBJV, even.so soul-in you.sit.for.me  
‘Even if I sleep, you are in my soul’

The specific meaning of this concessive construction can be derived from a paratactic structure that accounts for its specific meaning:<sup>31</sup> “you want<sup>32</sup> that I sleep? Then too you sit in my soul”.<sup>33</sup> However, I haven’t found yet a comparable structure “question + answer” where the answer expresses something (un)expected.<sup>34</sup> In this sense, our discussion is inconclusive. If the Megrelian construction is a calque of its Abkhaz counterpart, and was not copied from it, the problem will be shifted, but not solved.

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<sup>30</sup> A similar argument is adduced by Hewitt (1984) with regard to the preposed temporal clauses marked by final *tu ara* in Georgian (*tu* marks alternative questions).

<sup>31</sup> Note that a paratactic structure does not by itself “explain” subordination, and its assumption does not mean that there existed no subordinate structure which provided the pattern that could be extended to the paratactic structure by analogy; nor does it deny uniformitarianism, as if parataxis were “intrinsically early” and hypotaxis “intrinsically recent” – by a kind of “qualitative inspection” (Hoenigswald 1990:128) that has become largely obsolete since the second half of the 19th century (see e.g. Paul 1920:145 (1880); Boeder 1993-94).

<sup>32</sup> *gind* < *ginda* ‘lit.: you.want’; cp. Latin *vel* (< *velis* in alternative questions: “You want (the alternative) X? [You want non-X? All the same] then Y”) and *quamvis* ‘although < however much you want’. The semantic specificity of the underlying Georgian and Latin structures and the process of “bleaching” cannot be discussed here.

<sup>33</sup> For some discussion of parataxis and its relation to conversational structure (Levinson 1983 §6.4.3) see Boeder 1993-94:35-37.

<sup>34</sup> Similarly, I am not aware of a parallel from other languages where a yes-no-question is at the root of a temporal dependent clause, but this gap may already have been filled by somebody else.

5. The interrogative constructions reviewed here belong to the distinctive structures of Megrelian and its Kartvelian neighbour dialects.<sup>35</sup> All three deserve an in-depth study on the basis of systematic fieldwork, but even the outline given above shows that they cannot be described without reference to pragmatic facts. Interrogative constructions are an eminent resource of pragmatic, addressee-related expression and of textual clause-combining. The specific constructions described in the preceding sections (2.-4.) are related to, but not identical with, the more basic forms of interrogative sentences. This relationship is of a different type in each of the constructions.

a) In the first case (2.), the use of rhetorical questions was extended to a different type of knowledge characterising their implicit answer, at the same time preserving the grammatical structure of the “classical” variant.

b) The *wh*-clause construction (3.) is a sequence of two co-ordinate clauses plus the answer to the second (to the question). Its structure (including the conjunction “but”, the choice of tenses etc.) is largely fixed and idiomatised, and its meaning is non-compositional in the sense that the unexpectedness meaning is expressed by the whole construction rather than by its parts.

c) In the *-o*-clause construction (4.), some formal features of the presumed underlying question (the morphological shape and its lexically conditioned stress pattern) persist in the protasis, which is otherwise adapted to the form of a dependent clause and has lost its illocutionary force. The subordinator *-o* of the protasis signals the immediate succession relation between protasis and apodosis on the one hand, and two properties of the main clause apodosis on the other: the unexpectedness of its proposition and the fact that the event described in it is perceived by the subject of the protasis, i.e. the protagonist.

d) The best-known interrogative constructions are those grammaticalised as relative clauses. Their Megrelian type and its etymological equivalent in Georgian constitute an early isogloss of Kartvelian syntax (1.).

These four forms show a gradience with regard to the degree of the addressee’s involvement: the “rhetorical” question directly invokes the knowledge of the addressee; the *wh*-question construction involves the addressee by “withholding” the newsworthy information and by asking a cataphoric question, but the perspective is that of the protagonist who is surprised at what he sees; in the *-o*-clause construction the addressee is not formally involved: it is only the protagonist’s perspective that matters. Finally, in the

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<sup>35</sup> The constructions described in the sections 2. and 3. probably are an areal phenomenon. They also occur, for instance, in the Gurian dialect of Georgian (which in addition to being an immediate neighbour of Megrelian has a Megrelian/Laz substrate). Consider the following passage, where both constructions occur: *dayamebulia uḳve, aḳac čana aperi da ševšḿdito: vin mua, sa mua, vis ušvelot, ra vknat?! ucpatai ager k'ar gamuarda ušvelebuli ḳorio?! piri dapčenili ak, duḱ mozdiva, tvalebi ak gačtlebuli, gasisxlebuli da mua, mua, mara ras mua?! muak ḳoveliperi!* (Niḳolaišvili, to appear) ‘It was already night, nothing could be seen anymore, and we were frightened: Who will come, where will he come, who shall we help, what shall we do? Suddenly there rushed out a huge pig [“here AFF NEG it.rushed.out huge pig.NOM.QUOT”]. Its mouth is wide open, its slaver is dripping from it, its eyes are red and bloodshot, and it is coming, coming, but for what is it coming [“it.comes, it.comes, but what.DAT it.comes”]? It carries everything along!’.

relative and conjunctive clauses derived from interrogative constructions, neither the addressee nor the protagonist are involved. While a) and b) show a development of new specific “intersubjective” meanings (Traugott 2005), c) and d) show a loss of addressee-related features, which is a corollary of the loss of an independent illocutionary force in subordinate clauses; on the other hand, these clauses gain of a textual meaning (*viz.* clause-combining).

### **Abbreviations**

|       |                    |
|-------|--------------------|
| ADV   | adverbial case     |
| AOR   | aorist             |
| AFF   | affirmative prefix |
| AOR   | aorist indicative  |
| DAT   | dative             |
| ERG   | ergative           |
| GEN   | genitive           |
| INSTR | instrumental       |
| J     | juncture (glide)   |
| NEG   | negation           |
| NOM   | nominative         |
| PERF  | perfect            |
| PL    | plural             |
| Q     | question marker    |
| Q̇    | Q̇ipšize 1914      |
| QUOT  | quotative          |
| SUB   | subordinator       |
| SBJV  | subjunctive        |
| X     | Xubua              |

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პითხვითი კონსტრუქციების პრაგმატიკის შესახებ მკვლევარში

პითხვითი კონსტრუქციები წარმოადგენს პრაგმატული, ადრესატთან დაკავშირებული ასპექტების გამოხატვისა და ტექსტში წინადადებათა კომბინირების განსაკუთრებულ საშუალებას. ამ სტატიაში აღწერილი სპეციფიკური კონსტრუქციები უკავშირდება პითხვითი წინადადებების ბაზისურ ფორმებს, მაგრამ არ არის მათი იდენტური.

ა) „კლასიკურ“ რიტორიკულ შეკითხვებს ადრესატი იმ კონტრასტის საფუძველზე აღიქვამს, რომელიც არსებობს მისი შინაარსის „აშკარა“ ჭეშმარიტებასა და პითხვის როგორც სამეტყველო აქტის მოსამზადებელ პირობას შორის (იგულისხმება ის გარემოება, რომ პითხვის ავტორმა არ იცის პასუხი). მეგრულში (2.) ასეთი გამოყენება ვრცელდება ცოდნის გასხვავებულ ტიპზე: „(ხელმწიფე შეეკითხა: – რა გინდა მოგცეო; ამ სახელმწიფოს ნახევარს მოგცემ. გიორგიმ უთხრა: მე არ მინდა შენი სახელმწიფო, მე მინდაო ერთი ცხენი) *ხელმწიფე, რა თქმა უნდა, ამას არ მისცემდა?! [ხენწიფე, მუ რაგადი ოკო, ეს ვე მერხანდუო]*“ (ხუბ. 151,18-19). აქ იგულისხმება, რომ თხრობის ადრესატი შეძლებდა ა) წინასწარ განეჭვრიტა უარყოფით პითხვაში აღწერილი მოვლენა (ქმედება, სიტუაცია, მდგომარეობა და ა.შ.) და ბ) განესაზღვრა მისი ალბათობა (ეპისტემური მოდლობა) ტექსტის წინა ნაწილის, გარკვეული ტიპის ადამიანებისთვის დამახასიათებელი თვისებების, მოვლენათა ტიპური თანმიმდევრობის და მსგავს გარემოებათა საფუძველზე. ჩვენს მაგალითში ეს ალბათობა მაღალია, რადგან ლოგიკურად მოსალოდნელი იქნებოდა მეფის ასეთი ქმედება (რამდენადაც მან თავისი სამეფოს ნახევარი შესთავაზა, ცხენის მიცემასაც დათანხმდებოდა). მოვლენის მცირე ალბათობა, მეორე მხრივ, განაპირობებს გაოცებასთან (მოულოდნელობასთან) დაკავშირებულ ინტერპრეტაციას: „(ბიჭი რომ გამოვიდა, მოჭიდავეს გაეცინა, ასეთ ბავშვს როგორ უნდა ვეჭიდოო. მივიდა ეს ბიჭი და მოკიდა ხელი: აიღო და მიწაზე რომ დაანარცხა, მისი სიმძიმით ეს მოჭიდავე პარკივით არ გასკდა? [მუში სიმონკათი ათე მარკინეკ პარკიშორო ვა ქიგეხორცქუო] გაოცდა ყველა კაცი, რა საკვირველია!“ (ხუბ. 1,30-31). წინასწარმჭვრეტი ვარაუდი პროსპექტულია და ამ გაგებით უპირისპირდება თურმეობითის ევიდენციალურ მოდლობას, რომელიც არის ან არაპროსპექტული (რეტროსპექტული), რადგან აწმყო „წყაროების“ მიხედვით მიხედვით წარსულის ფაქტი ივარაუდება, ან „ადმირატიული“, მაგ.: *კაი კაცი ყოფილხარ* (რაც არ ვიცოდი).

ბ) კიდევ ერთი ტიპური თხრობითი კონსტრუქცია (3.) არის ორი თანწყობილი წინადადების თანმიმდევრობა, რომელსაც მოსდევს მესამე, პასუხი მეორე წინადადებაზე (ე.ი. პითხვაზე). მისი სტრუქტურა მნიშვნელოვანწილად იდიომატიზებულია და მოულოდნელობა გამოხატულია უფრო მთელი კონსტრუქციის მეშვეობით, ვიდრე მისი შემადგენლებით: „(გამოაღო კარი და რომ შეიხედა შიგნით,) *ნახა მაგრამ რა ნახა [ძირუ მარა მუ ძირუ]*“ (– რას ნახავს კაცის თვალი იმათზე უკეთესს: – სამი ანგელოზის მსგავსი ქალიშვილი (ქე) სხედან და ჭიკჭიკებენ“ (ხუბ. 3,33-34). ამ კონსტრუქციაში შესაბამისი „პასუხი“ თვით მოლაპარაკის მიერ არის გაცემული, პითხვაც და პასუხიც ერთსა და იმავე მოლაპარაკეს ეკუთვნის. ის არ გადადის ერთი მოლაპარაკისგან მეორეზე (არ არის „მონაცვლეობა“). ისინი ქმნიან მომიჯნავე

არადიალოგურ წყვილს, რომლის პირველი ნაწილი (კითხვა) მოითხოვს მეორე ნაწილს (პასუხს), როგორც ეს არის დიალოგში. „პასუხი“ (ე.ი. აპოდოზისი) გამოხატავს იმას, რასაც კითხვის სუბიექტი (ე.ი. პროტაგონისტი) არ მოელის. ამავე დროს, ადრესატისთვის კითხვას აქვს შემამზადებელი ფუნქცია: ეს არის კატაფორული საშუალება, რომელიც აფრთხილებს ადრესატს პასუხის მოულოდნელობის შესახებ.

გ) დამოკიდებული წინადადებები, რომლებსაც ბოლოს -ო (4.) აქვთ დართული, სემანტიკურად უახლოვდება ზემოხსენებულ კონსტრუქციას: „ცოლმა რომ გადახადა საბანი, თავისი ქალიშვილები მკვდარი ნახა [ოსურქ გამნაწყ შქართუნი-ო, მუში ცირა სქუალეფი ლუელო ქიძირქ]“ (ზუბ. 78,26-27). ამ კონსტრუქციებში პროტაზისში შენარჩუნებულია ისტორიულად არსებული კითხვის ზოგიერთი ფორმალური ნიშანი (მორფოლოგიური ფორმა და მისი ლექსიკურად განპირობებული მახვილის მოდელი, მაგრამ სხვაგვარად ის მისადაგებულია დამოკიდებული წინადადების ფორმას და დაკარგული აქვს დამოუკიდებელი ილოკუციური ძალა. ის დამოკიდებულია იმ გაგებით, რომ აპოდოზისის გარეშე არ გვხდება. მაგრამ ის ფაქტი, რომ პასუხადაც მიუღებელია ([კითხვა:] ცოლმა თავისი ქალიშვილები მკვდარი როდის ნახა? [პასუხი:] როდესაც საბანი გადახადა = მეგრული (მუჟამს) შქართუნი გამნაწყ-ნი, მაგრამ არა: \*შქართუნი გამნაწყ-ო) იმაზე მიუთითებს, რომ სინტაქსურად აპოდოზისის („მთავარი წინადადების“) შემადგენელი ანუ დაქვემდებარებული წინადადება არ არის. ფუნქციონალურად ო-ნიშნის პროტაზისი, ერთი მხრივ, იმაზე მიანიშნებს, რომ აპოდოზისით გამოხატული მომხდარი უშუალოდ მოსდევს პროტაზისით გამოხატულ მომხდარს და, მეორე მხრივ, მიუთითებს მთავარი წინადადების, აპოდოზისის, ორ მახასიათებელზე: პროპოზიციის შინაარსის მოულოდნელობასა და იმ გარემოებაზე, რომ მასში აღწერილი ფაქტის მოწმე პროტაზისის სუბიექტია (ე.ი. პროტაგონისტი).

დ) რაც შეეხება კითხვით კონსტრუქციებს, რომელიც გრამატიზებულია როგორც განსაზღვრებითი დამოკიდებული წინადადება (1.), ტოვო გუდავამ ივარაუდა მნიშვნელოვანი იზოგლოსი მეგრულსა და ქართულს შორის: *რო-მელ-* = *ნა-მუ* (შდრ. *ცმელ-* = მეგრული *ციმუ*) როგორც ნაცვალსახელი და როგორც კავშირი გვიანდელ ძველ ქართულში (*რომელ* > *რომ*). ქართველური განსაზღვრებითი დამოკიდებული წინადადების გაჩენა, როგორც ჩანს, უნდა განხილულ იქნეს უფრო როგორც კონტაქტებით გამოწვეული მოვლენა, ვიდრე შიდა რეკონსტრუქციის საკითხი და პრაგმატული გარემოებით განპირობებული ევოლუცია, რისი მცდელობაც იყო აქ ა) და ბ) პუნქტებში.

ა) და ბ) კონსტრუქციებში ჩართულია ადრესატი, ხოლო გ) და დ) დამოკიდებულ წინადადებებში, ეს კავშირი ადრესატთან გაწყვეტილია და დაკარგულია მათი ილოკუციური ძალაც.